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I. INTRODUCTION
"And sweet is death who puts an end to pain."
Alfred Lord Tennyson,
Idylls of the King [1859-1885]
Lancelot and Elaine, 1.1000
The United States Supreme Court granted review of two physi-
cian-assisted suicidel decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits. 2
These cases involved state statutes that regulate and criminalize as-
sisting in death.3 The Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco4 found a Four-
teenth Amendment equal protection violation in a New York statute
because similarly situated individuals were classified in a manner
that was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.5 This
decision pertained to competent, terminally ill adults who would be
legally prohibited from seeking active intervention in hastening
death, e.g., by a prescription of a lethal dose of medication, as com-
pared to similarly situated persons who would be permitted passive
intervention, e.g., by the removal of life support.6 In a unanimous
decision, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit ruling and held that New York's prohibition on assisted
suicide does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 The Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. Washing-
tons recognized a liberty interest in the determination of the time and
manner of death based upon the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive
1. Dr. Timothy E. Quill, a physician, and one of the plaintiffs seeking to overturn
New York state laws penalizing assistance in suicide, prefers the term "physi-
cian-assisted death." See Timothy E. Quill, Doctor, I Want to Die. Will You Help
Me? Special Communication, 270 JAMA 870 (1993); Timothy E. Quill, Physician-
Assisted Death: Progress or Peril?, 24 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THRmAT. BEHAV. 315
(1994). But cf. Timothy E. Quill et al, Sounding Board, Care of the Hopelessly
Ill, Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1380 (1992). Others concur with Dr. Quill's verbiage, in part because of the
"pejorative connotations" associated with the term "suicide." See Tom L.
Beauchamp, The Justification of Physician-Assisted Deaths, 29 IND. L. REv. 1173,
1200 (1996); Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional
Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292, 306 n.60 (1996)(discussing the prefer-
ence for "death" or "dying" terminology amidst activists in the right-to-die move-
ment). The authors continue to use the term "physician-assisted suicide" at this
time, in part because of its near universal acceptance. See infra note 210.
2. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Com-
passion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
3. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.30, 125.15 (McKinney 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9 A. 36.060 (West 1998); see also infra notes 306-330 and accompanying text
(discussing criminalization of assisting in death).
4. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
5. See id. at 725-31.
6. See id. at 729-31.
7. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
8. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Due Process Clause.9 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit, however, essentially allowing states to legislate and
prohibit physician-assisted suicide.' 0
This Article discusses the decisions of the circuit courts in the
above-mentioned cases and then analyzes the two United States
Supreme Court opinions which provide room for speculation as to fu-
ture decisions in this area. Thereafter, a proposed model state act to
authorize and regulate physician-assisted suicidei" is assessed along
with a discussion of state legislative activity.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE "RIGHT TO DIE" CASES
An age-old dilemma plaguing mankind is the need to balance the
rights of the individual with the rights of the larger group, the state.
Such a conflict of rights inevitably arises in any society, but in a soci-
ety as committed to individual autonomy as the United States, the
country whose consistent promise to generations of immigrants has
been the right to control their own destinies, this conflict becomes cen-
tral to preserving our way of life. We have attempted to negotiate be-
tween conflicting rights many times in judicial history. Such
negotiations are rarely satisfactory to either side of the conflict since
both the individual and the larger society obviously lose something in
the negotiation. Never, however, in this long history of balancing
rights, perhaps with the exception of the right to life and abortion
clash, has there been a debate more difficult than the current debate
over the right to die. This complicated conflict embodies the classic
dilemma: on one side is the individual's right to control his most inti-
mate decisions, such as the decision to avoid needless suffering and to
die with dignity; on the other side is the right of the larger society to
preserve the value of life.
The United States Constitution recognizes the inevitability of this
conflict in areas like the right to die. In fact, the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment are meant to
make certain that when the state abrogates the rights of an individual
9. See id.
10. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). This outcome was not
unexpected. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2 Cases Involving
Assisted Suicide; Justices, in an Unusually Personal Session, Reveal Their Reluc-
tance to Intercede, N.Y. Tnms, Jan. 9, 1997, at Al; see also Patricia Zapor, News
Analysis, Assisted Suicide Rulings: An open door to legalization?, PiLOT, July 18,
1997, at 21 (discussing how Supreme Court Justices left open the possibility of
permitting assisted suicide under different circumstances, especially in the con-
currences of Justices Stevens, Souter and O'Connor). As will be discussed in Part
M of this paper, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer aligned their views most closely
with Justice O'Connor.
11. See Charles H. Baron et al, Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HsARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996).
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to preserve the rights of the group, it does so fairly, rationally and only
when absolutely necessary. Two cases recently decided by federal cir-
cuit courts address the manner in which constitutional due process
and equal protection enter into the negotiation between the right of a
terminally ill adult to receive aid in dying and the right of the state to
preserve the value of human life. These cases were recently heard and
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. An analysis of the cir-
cuit court decisions in Compassion in Dying v. Washingtoni2 and Quill
v. Vacco13 reveals both the complexity and the unpredictability of us-
ing constitutional protections to negotiate a conflict of rights.
A. The Ninth Circuit: Compassion in Dying v. Washington
The first of these cases, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, was
actually the first right to die case decided by a federal court of appeals.
The plaintiffs included four physicians who treat terminally ill pa-
tients, three terminally ill patients and the non-profit Washington
group, Compassion in Dying. Together, these plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of a Washington statute which stated that "[a] per-
son is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aids another person to attempt suicide."i 4 The penalty for such ac-
tion, a felony under this statute, was imprisonment for up to five years
and a fine of up to $10,000.15 The plaintiff physicians did not chal-
lenge the "knowingly causes" portion of this statute. Rather, they cen-
tered their suit on the "or aids" provision, claiming this provision
deterred them from exercising their best professional judgment in pro-
viding aid to terminally ill, competent adults who wish to hasten their
deaths. In essence, the plaintiffs charged that the "or aids" provision
violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus was unconstitutional "both on
its face and as applied to terminally ill, mentally competent adults
who wish to hasten their own deaths with the help of medication pre-
scribed by their doctors."' 6
When deciding this case, the district court held that the Washing-
ton statute violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection
12. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), affg 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). The trial
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 850 F. Supp 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994). The latter appeals court decision was reversed and remanded sub
nom. in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
13. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part the district court's opinion. See 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The United
States Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision. See 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
14. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988).
15. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.020(c) (West 1988).
16. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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Clauses. 17 The district court did not, however, declare this statute un-
constitutional in its entirety, but only as applied to physician-assisted
suicide for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. A three-judge
panel for the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal and reversed the district
court's decision. Finding neither a due process nor equal protection
violation, this panel ruled that the Washington statute was not inva-
lid either on its face or as applied.1 s Recognizing the "extraordinary
importance" of this case, the Ninth Circuit decided to rehear Compas-
sion in Dying en banc.19 On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that the "or aids" provision of the statute as
applied to physicians prescribing life-ending medication at the request
of terminally ill, mentally competent adults violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having found the statute un-
constitutional in this context, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary
to consider the constitutionality of this law in the context of the Equal
Protection Clause.2 0
The disagreement among the courts underscores the abstract na-
ture of the determinations being made and the difficulty of negotiating
competing rights. While judicial tradition has established guidelines
for resolving such statutory dilemmas, the application of these guide-
lines is inconsistent, because judicial discussion of such issues often
involves as much personal value judgment as it does judicial prece-
dent. A look at the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Compassion in
Dying will illuminate this problem more completely.
When deciding whether a statute violates the Constitution's Due
Process Clause, the courts, recognizing that this clause is meant to
prevent capricious infringement of constitutionally-guaranteed indi-
vidual liberties, must first decide whether the statute actually in-
volves an individual liberty interest. In making this determination,
the Ninth Circuit cites three pivotal United States Supreme Court de-
cisions describing such a liberty interest. The first of these cases was
offered in a dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman,2 1
which postulated that the United States Constitution guarantees
more than the rights specifically enumerated. Here, Justice Harlan
claimed that "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause... broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substan-
tial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."2 2 In the same
17. See id. at n.7.
18. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
19. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
20. See Compassion in Dyingv. Washington 79 F.3d 790, 798 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
bane).
21. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
22. Id. at 543. See infra notes 121-129 and accompanying text discussing Justice
Souter's concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg.
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vein, Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,23 as-
serted that the Constitution guarantees the very broad "right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."24 Finally, the Ninth Circuit, noting the similarities be-
tween right-to-die and abortion cases, cited the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.25 Here,
the Court found that matters like abortion, "'involving the most inti-
mate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" 26
While the right to die is not specifically guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, the Ninth Circuit found this right to be of the type described
above. This is a pivotal determination which, as the United States
Supreme Court determination in this case proves, could easily be seen
differently by reasonable people. Citing Casey, the Ninth Circuit first
determined that the fundamental issue was whether a person had the
right to die, rather than whether one had the right to "aid" in dying.
Here, the circuit court further emphasized that the term "physician-
assisted suicide" solely means the "prescribing of medication by a phy-
sician for the purpose of enabling a patient to end his life."27 Having
established these parameters, the Ninth Circuit went on to cite the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Palko v. Connecticut28
and Moore v. East Cleveland29 as identifying the traditional
benchmarks of a liberty interest guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause. Here, the Compassion in Dying court found that the right to
die must be so clearly "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" that
"'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.'" 30 In
addition, such a liberty right was defined by the Supreme Court in
Moore as "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" 31
In addressing these benchmarks, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
approach to using such guidelines has been evolving as the conditions
of medical culture have changed. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that
the traditional balancing test which first classifies a disputed right as
fundamental, important or marginal and then applies to the state's
action in protecting its conflicting right, a strict, substantive, or ra-
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. Id. at 478.
25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
banc)(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
27. Id. at 802 n.14.
28. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
29. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
30. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
banc)(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1977)).
31. Id. at 803 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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tional basis standard of review, was gradually being replaced by a con-
tinuum approach.3 2 Citing the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Casey and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,33 the Ninth Circuit noted that these decisions suggest fine-
tuning the balancing test so that categories of rights and review stan-
dards are not so rigidly arbitrary. In these cases, the Supreme Court
seemed to be using an approach which assumed that the rights of the
individual and of the state can be placed on a continuum in terms of
importance. The test then becomes simple. The more important the
individual right upon which the state is attempting to infringe, the
more important and persuasive must be the state's reason for infring-
ing upon this right.34 This approach recognizes the arbitrary nature
of traditional categories and the difficulty of classifying specific rights
when using these categories.
Again, the Ninth Circuit rejected the concept that to qualify as a
liberty interest, a particular right must have been culturally accepted
in a nation's history.35 Rather, the Ninth Circuit cited decisions, in-
cluding Casey, which make clear that rights once denied to individuals
by the states, such as miscegenation, 3 6 have subsequently been recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court as rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. The reason for this changing lexicon of rights is that
the United States Constitution was meant to be a flexible document,
capable of adapting to a constantly evolving society.
The Ninth Circuit noted that a majority of Americans believe that
competent, terminally ill adults should have the right to request and
receive the aid of a physician in dying.37 This changed cultural atti-
tude reflects a changed medical culture. Today, Americans are more
likely to die a lingering, undignified death with the dubious help of
modern medical technology. However, while no state currently has a
statute prohibiting suicide or attempted suicide, the majority of states
have statutes against assisting in suicide.38 Here, the Ninth Circuit
believes that state statutes lag behind and thus do not reflect current
cultural attitudes. In this context, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
the Constitution is dynamic enough to provide legal protection for an
individual's due process liberty interest in hastening death. With this
increasingly flexible approach to finding constitutional inclusion of a
liberty right, the Ninth Circuit, not surprisingly, concluded that there
32. See id. at 804.
33. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
34. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
banc).
35. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
36. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 & nn.48-50 (9th Cir.
1996)(en banc).
38. See id. at 810 nn.45-46.
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exists a "strong liberty interest in determining how and when one's
life shall end" and that such an interest is protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 As the Ninth Circuit
recognized, however, reasonable jurists may not find this same liberty
interest to be within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
a jurist might point out that constitutional protection of a right to
assistance in dying might be attributing to the Constitution an elastic-
ity it was not meant to have.
However, the Ninth Circuit saw support for the assertion of a due
process liberty interest in the right to die by analogizing to two recent
Supreme Court decisions, Casey and Cruzan. As suggested above, the
Ninth Circuit found Casey informative because of its description of the
kind of choices which constitute a liberty interest. In Casey, the Court
found abortion to be one of the most "intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a life-time," and thus "central to personal dignity
and autonomy."4 0 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the right to
hasten one's death claimed by the plaintiffs in Compassion in Dying,
is a similar choice, and, like abortion, comes under the purview of the
Due Process Clause. Again, however, this conclusion is by no means
certain. Reasonable jurists may well find a difference between the na-
ture of the choice to have an abortion and the nature of the choice to
end one's life when terminally ill. In fact, this is a clear example of an
area where the constitutional flexibility claimed by the Ninth Circuit,
while sensitive to changing cultural mores and historical contexts, is
also likely to result in more room for personal values to impact legal
decisions.
The circuit court then cited the Supreme Court's Cruzan decision
as a more specific definition of the right to make the choice to die. In
Cruzan, the Court found that an individual has a "due process liberty
interest in rejecting unwanted medical treatment, including the provi-
sion of food and water by artificial means."4 ' This decision clearly af-
firms an individual's right to hasten his or her death.42 While not
addressing the right to receive aid in hastening death, Cruzan opened
the door for recognition of such a right. For many, the difference be-
tween refusing food and water and requesting and receiving a pre-
scription of lethal medication is negligible. However, again, many
people will conclude this difference is determinative.
Having found a constitutional liberty interest in determining the
time and manner of one's death, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to the
second phase of its analysis, the question of whether the Washington
39. See id. at 812. But see id. at 839 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
40. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
41. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. Of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
42. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,816 n.70 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
banc).
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statute abridged this right. In making this determination, the circuit
court considered the importance of the state's interests protected by
the statute, the method used by the statute to protect these interests,
the importance of the individual liberty interest abridged by the stat-
ute and the degree to which this interest is burdened by the statute.43
In this context, the circuit court found the State of Washington to have
legitimate interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, avoiding in-
volvement in suicide of third parties who might exert undue influence
on the decision, mitigating the effect on family members, protecting
the integrity of the medical profession and preventing adverse
consequences. 44
To protect these interests, Washington could prohibit assisted sui-
cide or regulate it. The Ninth Circuit found that the statute in ques-
tion constituted a virtual prohibition to exercising the liberty interest
in hastening death.45 Without physician assistance, the court noted
most terminally ill adults will be unable to satisfactorily control the
timing and circumstances of their deaths. Such patients generally
lack the requisite knowledge and mobility to assure the desired out-
come, and may, on their own, actually execute a failed suicide attempt
which leaves them in a less autonomous position than prior to the at-
tempt. Instead of such a prohibition, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
the statute could have been written in a less restrictive manner which,
instead of prohibiting assisted suicide, effectively regulated its occur-
rence.4 6 In fact, a model statute that has been proposed to accomplish
this goal will be discussed later in this analysis.
The Supreme Court espoused the statutory regulation of liberty in-
terests in Cruzan. While that decision upheld an individual's right to
refuse or terminate life-sustaining medical treatment, it also made
clear that states have a legitimate regulatory role to play in such deci-
sions. Thus, a Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence of a patient's wishes was upheld by the Cruzan Court.47 The
Ninth Circuit suggested that such reasonable regulation, designed to
protect the integrity of the decisionmaking process while minimally
burdening the terminally ill patient's liberty interest, is preferable to
the blanket ban on assisted suicide in the Washington statute.48 Such
a complete ban, the court noted, unfairly burdened a person's liberty
interest. In short, the circuit court's decision in Compassion in Dying
concluded that states should not completely proscribe important lib-
43. See id. at 816.
44. See id. at 816-31.
45. See id. at 832.
46. See id. at 832-33.
47. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health 261, 280-81 (1990).
48. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 833 (9th Cir. 1996)(en
banc).
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erty interests. Rather, states should regulate the exercise of these in-
terests to minimize the occurrence of abuses. The Ninth Circuit
intended this argument to refute the argument of jurists who are
loathe to recognize new rights beyond those recognized by the original
framers of the Constitution. However, the court's reasoning seems to
fall short of its objective. For reasonable jurists may conclude that the
holding, which does not allow states to prohibit an important liberty
interest, is not identical to deciding that the judiciary should refrain
from identifying new rights in the Constitution.
Having evaluated the legitimate state interests and the means
used to preserve those interests, the Ninth Circuit then analyzed the
strength of the liberty interest involved in this case and the burden
imposed on that liberty interest by the Washington statute. In this
context, the court found that the law in question impacted the plain-
tiffs when their liberty interest in hastening their deaths was at its
height. The court emphasized the continuum approach: while a
young, healthy person's liberty interest in the right to die is at the
lowest point on this continuum, a terminally ill, mentally competent
adult's liberty interest falls at the high point.49 To support this con-
clusion, the Ninth Circuit stated that, for such an adult, prohibiting
assisted suicide may be equivalent to mandating the kind of pain and
suff6ring the Casey Court found to result from banning abortions,
"'pain ... [and] suffering that is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist upon."'50
The Ninth Circuit then found the Washington statute did indeed
unduly burden this strong liberty interest. Citing abundant anecdotal
and medical evidence attesting to the suffering imposed on terminally
ill patients by such a statute, as well as to the gruesome means of
suicide to which patients who wish to end their suffering are then
forced to resort, the court also emphasized the emotional toll on family
members who either agree to assist in suicide or refuse to provide such
assistance.5 1 In this phase of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the plaintiffs had a strong liberty interest which was being
unduly burdened.
The Ninth Circuit then applied the balancing test, weighing the
legitimate state interests against the conflicting individual liberty in-
terests. Recalling the existence of a continuum along which the
strength of these rights can be represented, the court concluded that
the strength of the state's interests actually varies inversely with the
strength of the individual's liberty interest. 52 Thus, while the liberty
interest of a suffering, competent, terminally ill adult is at its height,
49. See id. at 834.
50. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)).
51. See id. at 836.
52. See id. at 836-37.
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the state's interest in preserving that person's life, and all the permu-
tations of that interest, is at its low point. The Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged that in the case of a terminally ill adult, Washington has a
strong interest in preventing undue influence on that adult's decision
as well as a strong interest in preventing other abuses of the individ-
ual's liberty right. However, the court found that the strength of the
individual's liberty interest in such a case still outweighed the
strength of the state's interest in preventing abuse, particularly in
light of the state's ability to prescribe the involvement of a physician
and other procedural safeguards.5 3 In fact, the Ninth Circuit strongly
asserted that, if the Washington statute was allowed to stand, "it is
hard to envision where the exercise of arbitrary and intrusive power
by the state can be halted."54 It should be noted that at every point
where the court made decisions about the relative strength of compet-
ing interests, there were subjective value judgments involved which,
while reasonable in themselves, could easily be reversed by other rea-
sonable jurists.
The final legal authority examined by the Ninth Circuit in Com-
passion in Dying was the district court decision in Lee v. Oregon.55
The Ninth Circuit gave this decision short shrift. In Lee, the district
court held that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, a statute which
allows physicians to prescribe medication for use by terminally ill pa-
tients to end their lives, "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives terminally ill persons of a
benefit that is accorded to the non-terminally ill."56 The circuit court
in Compassion in Dying emphasized the Lee decision's lack of logic.
For, what the Lee court termed a benefit, protection of the terminally
ill patient from physician assistance in committing suicide, is the very
burden from which the plaintiffs in Compassion in Dying sought re-
lief. Conversely, the Lee court saw the burden of continuing a life of
unmitigated pain, which is certain to end in death, as a benefit. While
the Lee decision seems clearly erroneous, it can also be viewed as the
result of a world view which puts a supreme value on life, no matter
what its form, to bear on facts about which reasonable individuals
may draw different conclusions.
While rejecting the Lee decision about the reach of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause over the right to hasten one's death, the Ninth Circuit
refused to analyze this issue on its own. Instead, the court deter-
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). This decision was vacated and remanded by the
appeals court. See 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v.
Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997); see also infra notes 232-95 and accompanying
text discussing Lee.
56. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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mined that the Washington statute banning assisted suicide violated
constitutional due process protection as applied to terminally ill
adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication pre-
scribed by doctors.57 Having found a constitutional violation sufficient
to uphold the district court's finding that the Washington statute was
unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to consider
whether this statute also violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.5 8
As suggested above, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in
Dying represents a reasonable approach to the issues in this case.
However, as the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, there is much in this
case which may be viewed differently in the light of different value
systems. Again, the degree to which the Constitution can be con-
strued to encompass rights not specifically enumerated, also looks dif-
ferent in the light of differing judicial philosophies. Perhaps this is
why the United States Supreme Court rendered the decision it did
when considering this case. A conservative approach to applying the
Constitution to right to die cases may be necessary to prevent too
much bending of the Constitution to changing cultural mores. While
the Constitution may have been meant to evolve with society, it was
also meant to guide the evolution of that society according to certain
principles which were indeed incontrovertible and clearly essential to
the preservation of liberty and justice for all.
B. The Second Circuit: Quill v. Vacco
Within one month of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in
Dying, the Second Circuit decided Quill v. Vacco, 59 another "right to
die" case. In Quill, however, the Second Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion but on different grounds. Here, the court found unconstitu-
tional two New York statutes which made assisting in suicide a
felony.60 However, the Second Circuit did this, not because the stat-
utes violated the Due Process Clause, but because they violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
In this case, the plaintiffs, three physicians and three individuals
in the final phase of terminal illness, challenged the constitutionality
of the New York statutes on the same grounds as those on which the
Compassion in Dying plaintiffs challenged the Washington statute.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants, rejecting the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
claims. 61 The plaintiffs appealed and the Second Circuit upheld the
57. See id. at 838.
58. See id.
59. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
60. See id. at 719.
61. See id. at 718.
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district court's decision on the due process claim, but reversed on the
equal protection claim.6 2
When considering whether the New York statutes violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that important liberty interests
will not be abridged without due process, the Second Circuit viewed
the issue differently than the Ninth Circuit. Here, the susceptibility
of these questions to differing interpretations by differing jurists, all of
whom are presumably reasonable, becomes obvious. The Quill court
found there was no important liberty interest or fundamental right to
hasten one's death.63 The court considered the Palko and Moore
precedents for determining which rights not enumerated in the Con-
stitution should be afforded due process protection. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the right to control the time and manner of
one's death did not meet the criteria set forth in these precedents. In
opposition to the Ninth Circuit decision, the Quill court did not see the
right to die as meeting the Palko prerequisite of being so "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed."6 4
When considering the imperative in Moore, that a fundamental lib-
erty interest must be "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradi-
tion," the Second Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's dynamic view of
the Constitution as a flexible document which could adapt to a chang-
ing society. Rather, the Quill court noted the United States Supreme
Court's reluctance to expand the list of fundamental rights protected
by the Due Process Clause, citing the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick65
which refused to strike down sodomy laws because of their deep his-
torical roots. The Second Circuit emphasized that the Supreme
Court's refusal to discover new fundamental rights reflected that
Court's belief that the judiciary comes "nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogniza-
ble roots in the language or design of the Constitution."66 Here, the
Second Circuit clearly recognized the danger implicit in adapting the
Constitution too freely to a changing society in an attempt to validate
a desired social policy, as perhaps was done by the court in Compas-
sion in Dying.
Having found no due process liberty interest in the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge of the New York statutes, the Quill court, unlike the Compas-
sion in Dying court, turned to an analysis of the plaintiffs' equal
protection challenge. Here, the plaintiffs sought to invoke the protec-
tion afforded by the Equal Protection Clause's mandate that "'all per-
62. See id.
63. See id. at 725.
64. Id. at 724; see also supra note 30.
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996).
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sons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 67 This clause
does not undermine the ability of the state to treat differently things
that are, in fact, different. In fact, in Plyler v. Doe,6S the United States
Supreme Court held that "[t]he initial discretion to determine what is
'different' and what is 'the same' resides in the legislatures of the
states."69 In line with this holding, the general rule has been that
state legislation "carries a presumption of validity if the statutory
classification is 'rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 70
The Quill court settled on rational basis scrutiny, which usually gov-
erns judicial review of social welfare legislation or economic legisla-
tion, after having rejected the strict scrutiny review which is reserved
for fundamental rights and intermediate scrutiny review.7 1
The Second Circuit then determined that the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment has long been established in New York through case
law72 and later by statute.7 3 In fact, in acknowledgment of this judi-
cial precedent, in 1987 the New York legislature enacted a statute
which gave competent citizens the right to issue "do not resuscitate"
orders. This statute established the kinds of procedural safeguards
suggested by the Ninth Circuit as acceptable methods for narrowing
the Washington statute.74 Again, in 1990, the New York legislature
enacted a statute which accords competent citizens the right to sign a
health care proxy, authorizing a designated agent to make health care
decisions, including decisions about administration of artificial hydra-
tion and nutrition for the patient. This law also includes extensive
procedural safeguards designed to prevent abuses.7 5 Finally, the Quill
court cited Cruzan which assumed that "'the United States Constitu-
tion would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right
to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'"7 6
Given the fact that competent, terminally ill New York citizens
have the statutory right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,
the Second Circuit in Quill found that New York does not treat simi-
larly situated persons alike because "those in the final stages of termi-
nal illness who are on life support systems are allowed to hasten their
deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are
67. Id. at 725 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
68. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
69. Id. at 216.
70. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 725 (2d Cir. 1996)(quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
71. See id. at 726-27; see also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986).
72. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64
(N.Y. 1981).
73. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2964, 2982 (McKinney 1996).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 1990).
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similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sus-
taining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-adminis-
tering prescribed drugs."77 The obvious question arising here is
whether the "except for" clause in the previous sentence negates the
Second Circuit's finding: If patients are similarly situated except for
dependence on life-support systems, are such patients actually simi-
larly situated?
Having found unequal treatment, the Second Circuit then applied
a "rational basis" test to determine if the unequal treatment was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest. Because the Quill court
saw the state as having little interest in "requiring the prolongation of
life that is all but ended,"78 or in any of the possible state interests
considered by the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying,79 the Second
Circuit found that the New York statutes were not rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. Therefore, the Quill court struck down
the New York statutes, holding that to "the extent that the statutes in
question prohibit persons in the final stages of terminal illness from
having assistance in ending their lives by the use of self-administered,
prescribed drugs, the statutes lack any rational basis and are violative
of the Equal Protection Clause."8 0
Interestingly, the Second Circuit declined to find a due process vio-
lation in the New York statutes, which the Ninth Circuit posited for
the Washington statutes, because the Second Circuit refused to find
abstract concepts not specifically rooted in the Constitution. However,
in finding that the New York statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the Second Circuit itself seems to expand upon the meaning of
"similarly circumstanced," positing a specific meaning to the phrase
which cannot necessarily be proven.
These two appellate decisions, Compassion in Dying v. Washington
and Quill v. Vacco, clearly reveal the problems attendant on this issue
which are yet to be fully resolved. Is there a fundamental right to
hasten one's death? Can such a right be safely legislated? Is there a
meaningful distinction between terminating artificial hydration and
nutrition and taking prescribed drugs in a lethal dose? When are ter-
minally-ill patients truly "similarly circumstanced?" What constitutes
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest? In light of the
United States Supreme Court's recent resolution of these two cases,
what case, if any, would provide a better vehicle to successfully chal-
lenge a state statute prohibiting physician-assisted suicide? Finally,
will state statutes authorizing assisted suicides prevail against future
constitutional challenges? As illustrated in Compassion in Dying and
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 730 n.2.
80. Id. at 727.
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Quill, there are indeed questions about which reasonable jurists
might disagree. In fact, perhaps reasonable disagreement is the
proper course in such a debate. Such tugging to the right and left of
center is what, in the long run, actually maintains an accurate bal-
ance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the state.
While this alternate tugging may be viewed in the two appellate deci-
sions examined above, it also seems clear that the general tendency of
lower courts is to allow competent, terminally ill adults to control the
time and manner of their death. This is the conclusion that both the
Ninth and Second Circuits reached, apparently by bringing that con-
viction to bear on the abstract language of the Constitution.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
"They'll give him death by inches"
William Shakespeare
Cariolanus, V, iv, 43
A. No Rightful Death
In the final days of its 1997 term, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decisions on the two "right to die" cases.8 1 The
Court voted unanimously to uphold the constitutionality of state bans
on physician-assisted suicide in Washington and New York.82 While
legal experts generally expected the Court to leave the regulation of
physician-assisted suicide to individual states,8 3 the opinions reflect
an interesting divergence of analytical viewpoints among the Jus-
tices,84 further indicating that a future challenge may be viable. For
now, however, for good or ill, the states will provide the legislative
81. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997).
82. See John Aloysius Farrell, No absolute 'right to die,' Supreme Court rules, Bans
upheld assisted suicide; issue is left open, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1997, at Al;
Janny Scott, The Supreme Court: News Analysis; An Issue That Won't Die, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 1997, at Al.
83. See Carey Goldberg, Oregon Moves Nearer to New Vote On Allowing Assisted Sui-
cide, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1997, at A25 (noting most legal observers expect Jus-
tices to rule that assisted suicide should be left to state regulation); Richard A.
Knox, Suicide fight seen shifting to the states; High Court is expected to reject a
right to doctor-assisted death, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1997, at Al; David E.
Rosenbaum, Americans Want a Right to Die. Or So They Think, N.Y. TmEs, June
8, 1997, § 4, at 3 (stating in reference to the two pending cases that "[t]he almost
universal view in legal circles is that the Supreme Court will overturn the ap-
peals courts and let the state laws stand").
84. See generally The Supreme Court: Physician-Assisted Suicide, Excerpts From De-
cision That Suicide Bans Are Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A18
(illustrating varying perspectives among Justices despite their general agree-
ment to reverse the Ninth and Second Circuits' rulings that the Washington and
New York statutes banning assisted suicide were unconstitutional).
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'laboratory' for measures that either prohibit, restrict or authorize
physician-assisted suicide.85
The Court provided a rapt audience of constitutional scholars with
two lengthy and seemingly overlapping opinions. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, no fundamental liberty interest in assisted suicide was
recognized by the Court pursuant to its substantive due process analy-
sis.86 Thus, there will be no 'rightful death' actions as there are
'wrongful death' actions.8 7 Absent direct precedent supporting a right
to assisted suicide, this outcome was predictable in light of the Court's
increasing resistance to ad hoc proclamations of fundamental rights or
interests that deserve Fourteenth Amendment due process protec-
tion.8 8 The Court refused to adopt an expansionist approach, hesitat-
85. Justice O'Connor referred to the "'laboratory' of the States." Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997)(O'Connor, J., concurring)(citing Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)(O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)). There will
no doubt be regulatory activity in both directions. See infra notes 200-328 and
accompanying text; see also Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L.
REv. 45, 55-66 (1996)(discussing regulatory climate for criminalizing and legaliz-
ing physician-assisted death).
86. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997). As will be discussed,
while the Court proclaimed no fundamental liberty interest in the right to die,
various Justices indicated their leanings and implicitly or explicitly projected
some prerequisites for a different outcome in a future case.
87. The authors pose this designation as an original legal term, one that clearly con-
trasts with the wrongful death concept. Of course, theoretically, a state could
legislate such a claim. Wrongful death actions involve a cause of action for the
benefit of decedent's beneficiaries on the basis that a defendant negligently or
willfully caused the death. See BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990). A
"rightful death" refers to the individual's right to control the "how" of his or her
death, rather than "whether" he or she will die. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293, 2307 (1997)(Stevens, J., concurring)(positing a liberty interest in "deciding
how, rather than whether, a critical threshold shall be crossed"); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2307 (1997)(Stevens, J., concurring)(disclaiming an
"absolute right to physician-assisted suicide" but referring to a "liberty interest in
deciding how, rather than whether, a critical threshold shall be crossed" as a
"specific interest in making decisions about how to confront an imminent death").
88. See Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws Banning As-
sisted Suicide from the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DEr. MERCY
L. REv. 771, 776-84 (1995) (discussing problem the Court would encounter in de-
claring a new fundamental right to die in light of its conservative approach over
the past decade, and differentiating the Supreme Court precedents that circuit
courts later relied upon in Compassion in Dying v. Washington and Quill v.
Vacco, the two right to die cases); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, The Right to
Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1124 (1997)(advising that the "Court should be wary of
recognizing rights of this kind" but if the Court "assumes that the right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide qualifies as 'fundamental' under the Due Process Clause, a
legal ban on physician-assisted suicide is constitutionally permissible in light of
the state's legitimate and weighty interests in preventing abuse, protecting pa-
tient autonomy, and avoiding involuntary death"); Hon. Daniel A.- Manion, Lec-
ture, Rights That Are Wrong, 72 NoTRE DAA1i L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1996)(criticizing
tendency of litigants who press for constitutional rights and commenting on the
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ing to extrapolate from the context of abortion or other reproductive
rights to the active termination of the lives of competent adults.89
The withdrawal of life support, or even of food and water, is a le-
gally protected method of hastening the death of a terminally ill, com-
petent adult who requests such passive intervention.90 The right to
refuse treatment has long been recognized at common law, as has the
distinction between active and passive means, the latter proving par-
ticularly critical to the Court's finding that there was no equal protec-
tion violation in Vacco. 9 1 The Court declined to "reverse centuries of
[Anglo-American jurisprudential] doctrine and practice" in order to
honor the respondent's claim of a fundamental liberty interest in as-
sisted suicide.92 Consequently, there is no right to suicide itself, but
just a lightening of criminal sanctions that primarily penalized the
actor's survivors. 93 Absent fundamental right status for assisted sui-
cide, the Washington statute needed only be rationally related to legit-
imate governmental interests, which standard the Court found was
unquestionably met.9 4
The Court deferred to the legislative and democratic processes as
appropriate vehicles to further the assisted suicide debate.95 As a ter-
ritorial or even jurisdictional question, the Court did not see itself as
"right to assisted suicide recently found by the Second and Ninth Circuits" [in
Quill v. Vacco and Compassion in Dying v. Washington] while at the same time
no right to sue was permitted for an unborn baby killed by an amniocentesis
needle in Florida [no citation on this case was provided]). Judge Manion's com-
parison raises the wrongful death concept (denied to a fetus in this instance) and
contrasts it with the right to assisted suicide which we have labeled "rightful
death." See supra note 1. Another commentator compares the claimed right to
assisted suicide to the emergence of the recognition of a cause of action for wrong-
ful life. See Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to
Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 108-15 (1996).
89. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270-71 (1997) (distinguishing
other personal autonomy cases from physician-assisted suicide).
90. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-98 (1997). The Court makes much of
intent and the (primary) cause of death as well as of the distinction between "kill-
ing" and "letting die." See id. at 2298-2301.
91. Cf. id. at 2305-06 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens interpreted Cruzan
as authorizing "affirmative conduct that would hasten [the petitioner's] death."
Id. Justice Stevens saw this right to refuse treatment as "an aspect of a far
broader and more basic concept of freedom that is even older than the common
law." Id. at 2306.
92. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997).
93. See id. at 2264. The confiscation of the decedent's goods primarily harmed the
remaining heirs and likely did little to discourage the act of suicide. Suicide is
generally thought to be the product of psychological or psychiatric problems.
Studies illustrate that ninety-five percent of those who kill themselves have a
diagnosable mental disorder at death. See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT 9-11 (1994) [hereinafter, NEW YORK
STATE TAsK FORCE].
94. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
95. See id. at 2275 and 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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vested with the power to create a right to assisted suicide.96 Rather,
the people of any state may act by ballot initiative or bicameral legis-
lative process to delineate a model that represents the majority
view.97 This has been the route followed by Oregon, where a second
vote on the nation's first law permitting physician-assisted suicide re-
instated the law in November 1997. 98
B. Comparing Opinions: Where the Justices Stand on the
Issues
The Court's opinions in the two 'right to die' cases are intertwined.
This is because the cases both determined the validity of state prohibi-
tions on assisted suicide. The difference between the cases is largely
the constitutional basis for the challenge to the state statute in ques-
tion. In Vacco v. Quill, the challenge devolved upon the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, whereas in Washington v.
Glucksberg, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause set the
standard for review.99 The rationale provided by the Justices in their
opinions is inclined to overlap from one decision to the other.oo In
fact, Justice O'Connor's concurrences are identical in the two deci-
sions, as are Justice Breyer's two concurring opinions and Justice Ste-
vens' opinions.X0 1
96. The Court repeatedly referred to the states' activity in this matter and noted
their trend to prohibit assisted suicide. See id. at 2265-67.
97. See infra notes 200-295 and accompanying text discussing model statute and the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act.
98. See Timothy Egan, The 1997 Elections: Right to Die: In Oregon, Opening a New
Front in the World of Medicine, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 6, 1997, at A26 (discussing vic-
tory of right-to-die camp that Oregon law survived repeal effort); Goldberg, supra
note 83. At this time, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration has warned
physicians who prescribe drugs under the Oregon law that they will face severe
sanctions. See Timothy Egan, Threat From Washington Has Chilling Effect on
Oregon Law Allowing Assisted Suicide, N.Y. Tnixs, Nov. 19, 1997, at A18.
99. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997).
100. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997)(Souter, J., concurring). "The rea-
sons that lead me to conclude in Glucksberg that the prohibition on assisted sui-
cide is not arbitrary under the due process standard also support the distinction
between assistance to suicide, which is banned, and practices such as termination
of artificial life support and death-hastening pain medication, which are permit-
ted." Id.
101. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997)(O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see id. at 2310-12 (Breyer, J. concurring); see id. at 2304-2310 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2303 (1997)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see id. at 2310-12 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 2304-10 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's single sentence concurrence in both de-
cisions is identical as well. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310
(1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2310
(1997)(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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In Glucksberg, as in Vacco, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court.10 2 In both decisions, Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion.10 3 Justice
O'Connor's joinder created a seemingly bare majority opinion, but at
least prevented the weaker appearance of a plurality opinion for the
Court. Justice O'Connor filed the same concurring opinion in both
cases and Justice Ginsberg concurred in the Court's judgments "sub-
stantially for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion."1o 4 Justice Breyer's opinions concurred in the Court's judg-
ments, but he expressly adopted the views of Justice O'Connor, except
where she joined the majority.1 0 5
Justice Stevens wrote a forceful opinion, concurring with the
Court's judgments, but made clear that he saw a number of issues
differently.10 6 For instance, there is "room for further debate about
the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to
punish" physician-assisted suicide.107 Another point Justice Stevens
raised is that the Court has not always placed the same value on every
life; for example, in the instance of capital punishment, state legisla-
tures create categories of lives that the state may terminate.10 8 While
the Court has deemed such capital punishment schemes constitu-
tional pursuant to a facial challenge, other applied challenges have
been successful.1 0 9 The analogy to assisted-suicide statutes and chal-
lenges concerning their constitutional validity seems appropriate.
102. See Washington v.Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997).
103. See id. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas did not file separate opinions in the
two decisions.
104. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310 (1997)(Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2310 (1997)(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Ginsburg did not elaborate upon the matter further.
105. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310-12 (1997)(Breyer, J., con-
curring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2310-12 (1997)(Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer would reformulate the liberty interest claimed to permit a "right
to die with dignity" that would have "at its core . . .personal control over the
manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unneces-
sary and severe physical suffering-combined." Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 2258, 2311 (1997). Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Souter's reference to
the "certain interests [that] require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgment." Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring)(referencing id. at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring) and citing Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
106. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2304 (1997)(Stevens, J.,
concurring).
107. Id.
108. See id. Because Washington has authorized the death penalty, Justice Stevens
concluded that the state already varies the value placed upon lives and the has-
tening of death in some circumstances. See id. at 2304-05.
109. See id. at 2304. Justice Stevens noted that mounting a facial challenge to a stat-
ute is the most difficult and he criticizes the strict standard for a facial challenge
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Justice Stevens projected optimism concerning an applied chal-
lenge to an assisted suicide ban.110 At the same time, he perceived an
interest in dignity and in determining how imminent death occurs.1 1 1
Furthermore, while Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's active/
passive distinction as a basis for state classification in Vacco, he ques-
tioned whether there is in fact much difference in the intent behind
the two methods.112 He referred to the practice of terminal sedation
as an example of the "illusory character of any differences" between
termination of treatment (passive means) and assisted suicide (active
means).1 13 In terminal sedation, medication as pain relief is known to
hasten death.114 Yet the practice of terminal sedation falls into a gray
area where it is not categorized as assisted suicide. It is an acceptable
practice medically and legally in large part because the primary intent
is to relieve pain and suffering. Justice Stevens questioned where the
line should be drawn in these close cases. 1 15 The question at this time
seems to turn upon the primary intent of the medication-whether it
is administered to alleviate suffering or to hasten death. The actual
immediate cause of death may be the lethal sedatives, whether the
practice is terminal sedation or assisted suicide. It is arguable
whether the same intent and causation apply in physician-assisted su-
icide cases that hover at the border of terminal sedation.116
It is noteworthy that Justices O'Connor and Breyer specifically re-
lied upon the ability of a patient to obtain relief from pain and suffer-
to a legislative act pronounced in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), a
standard that Justice Stevens did not believe the Court has ever actually applied.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2304-05 (1997)(Stevens, J., con-
curring). Others criticize the Salerno rule as well. See Law, supra note 1, at 325-
330 (stating that standard from Salerno is unwise).
110. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2304-05, 2308-10 (1997)(Stevens,
J., concurring).
111. See id. at 2306-07.
112. See id. at 2309-10; see also George Annas, Legal Issues in Medicine, Death By
Prescription, The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1240, 1241-42
(1994)(noting importance of intent in terms of accepted medical practice and
criminal law).
113. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310 (1997)(Stevens, J.,
concurring).
114. See id. In many instances of terminal sedation, food and hydration are with-
drawn to hasten the patient's passage from coma to death. See Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997). Informed consent and the "double effect"justify the
practice of terminal sedation "in that the intent is to relieve pain." Id. at 2302
n.11 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 (quoting P. Rousseau, Terminal Seda-
tion in the Care of Dying Patients, 156 ARCHNVES INTERNAL MED. 1785, 1785-86
(1996))). "Double effect" refers to the secondary outcome of hastened death pro-
duced by pain relief medication. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note
93, at 163.
115. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310 (1997)(Stevens, J.,
concurring).
116. See id.
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ing under current law as they justified allowing state prohibitions on
assisted suicide to stand.1 17 Justice Breyer predicated the avoidance
of "severe physical pain (connected with death)" as comprising "an es-
sential part of any successful claim."118 This is not present in the in-
stant cases where the state laws in question "do not prohibit doctors
from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite
the risk that those drugs themselves will kill."119 The New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law determined that the provision of pain
relief, in the form of sedatives and analgesics, is ethically and profes-
sionally acceptable even if a secondary or double effect of the drugs is
to hasten the patient's death, so long as the intent is to relieve severe
discomfort, not to cause death.120
Justice Souter concurred in the judgments of the Court, writing a
separate opinion in each case. 12 1 In Glucksberg, Justice Souter out-
lined his reasons for concluding that Washington's ban on assisted su-
icide is not arbitrary under the due process standard; thereafter, he
summarily applied this rationale in support of New York's ban on as-
sisted suicide. This ban, of course, can be distinguished from the le-
gally permissible termination of artificial life support and
administration of pain relief that simultaneously hastens death.122
Justice Souter concluded "that assisted suicide is not a fundamental
right entitled to recognition at this time,... [but] accord[s] the claims
raised ... a high degree of importance, requiring a commensurate
justification."123
In Glucksberg, Justice Souter saw an applied challenge to the
Washington statute, one that was narrower than the Court ac-
117. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(noting that there are no legal barriers
"to obtaining medication.., to alleviate... suffering, even to the point of causing
unconsciousness and hastening death," and thus "there is no need to address the
question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in
obtaining relief from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of
their lives"). Justice Breyer agreed with Justice O'Connor that there is no need
for the Court to decide whether a right is fundamental since state law does not
prevent administration of drugs to avoid pain at life's end. If the law did not
allow "avoidance of severe physical pain," then the "core of the interest in dying
with dignity" would be more affected, and "the Court might have to revisit its
conclusions in these cases." Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 2311. Here, one supposes that Justice Breyer refers to a future claim.
119. Id. (citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 163 n.29).
120. See NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 162-63.
121. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997)(Souter, J., concurring).
122. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997)(Souter, J., concurring); Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275-93 (1997)(Souter, J., concurring).
123. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997)(Souter, J., concurring)(emphasis ad-
ded)(referring to claims raised by patients and physicians in both cases).
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cepted.12 4 In his discussion of the parties' arguments, Justice Souter
reviewed the state's concern about the difficulty in confining an as-
sisted suicide right to voluntary decisions of competent terminally ill
adults.' 25 He then provided an historical overview of substantive due
process methodology, focusing particularly upon the dissent of Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ulman.i 2 6 Valuing the competing interests of the
state and the individual is but the first step of such an analysis.127
The question then becomes whether the justification for the legislation
is so at odds "with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or poin-
tlessly applied."i 28 If so, the statute must fail and the individual may
be said to have a constitutional right.129
The balancing of interests called upon the Court to form a reasoned
judgment.' 3 0 As with the common law generally, the boundary is ever
evolving and the recognition of new claims must proceed slowly from
existing recognized claims.' 3 ' It seems that assisted suicide hardly
falls into this category, in Justice Souter's view, since most states still
criminally punish the act of assistance.' 3 2 That suicide itself is
decriminalized in Washington does not answer the question. Justice
Souter concluded that "it may indeed make sense for the State to take
its hands off suicide as such, while continuing to prohibit the sort of
assistance that would make its commission easier."' 33 He also noted
that analogies to the instant case may be made to abortion cases,
wherein the state has an interest in discouraging abortion, and that
this must be balanced with the individual's right to a physician's coun-
sel and care.13 4 The legality of the practice of terminal sedation
124. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 n.2 (1997)(Souter, J.,
concurring).
125. See id. at 2276; see also id. at 2285-86 (describing a claimed right for a narrow
class to help others also in a narrow class).
126. Id. at 2277 n.4 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Souter noted the Court's repeated use of the Harlan dissent. See Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2277 n.4, 2280 (1997).
127. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2283 (1997)(Souter, J., concur-
ring)(citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
128. Id.
129. See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)).
Justice Souter would reserve the term "right" for cases where the individual's
interest trumps the state's interest.
130. See id. at 2284 (Souter, J., concurring). The reasons provided for selecting state-
ments of the competing interests are as important as the results in substantive
due process cases. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 2286. This accords with Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale in Glucks-
berg. See id. at 2266.
133. Id. at 2287 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 Comment 5 (1980)).
134. See id. at 2288.
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evoked further support for the respondent's argument that physician-
assisted suicide is simply part of the evolution of patient care.13 5
Justice Souter followed the respondent's arguments through three
steps which he characterized as "of increasing forcefulness."1 36 He
concluded that "[t]here can be no stronger claim to a physician's
assistance than at the time when death is imminent," further stating
that the important individual interest, "as within that class of 'certain
interests' demanding careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim...
cannot be gainsaid."1 37 Whether "in some circumstances or at some
time," this interest which might be "seen as fundamental" need not be
decided here because of the seriousness of the state's interests which
"defeat the present claim."13 8
Justice Souter perceived the emergence of a slippery slope: a dan-
gerous progression from the limited right that respondents purport to
seek to involuntary euthanasia.13 9 The lines are not easy to draw in
ascertaining a patient's competence or the voluntariness of a decision
for assisted suicide. Likewise, the step from patient self-administra-
tion of lethal medication to physician administration is small. Unfor-
tunately, the "gatekeepers" of the medical system have their own
economic agenda that may bias their judgment in such matters.1 40
Just how successful state legislation will be remains to be seen, but
there is much factual disagreement as to how effective similar guide-
lines in the Netherlands have been in protecting the voluntariness of
patient decisions.1 41 The specter of involuntary euthanasia clearly
135. See id. Critical to the legality of such pain relief administration is that the pri-
mary intent of the action is to alleviate pain. See supra notes 90, 113-16 and
accompanying text (discussing importance of intent and the practice of terminal
sedation).
136. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2289-90 (1997)(Souter, J., concur-
ring). The steps are: (1) the decriminalization of suicide itself takes away the
underpinning or leaves the criminality of assisted suicide "open to questioning,"
(2) decriminalization of suicide makes the act a free choice sounding somewhat
like an individual's option in recognized instances of bodily autonomy (such as
abortion), and (3) the claim to physician-assisted suicide follows from "the tradi-
tional right to medical care and counsel, subject to the limiting conditions of in-
formed, responsible choice when death is imminent." Id.
137. Id. at 2290 (citing Poe v. Ullmann, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
138. Id. The state interests are: "protecting life generally .... discouraging suicide
even if knowing and voluntary .... and protecting terminally ill patients from
involuntary suicide and euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary." Id. The
final interest justified the ban on physician-assisted suicide in Justice Souter's
opinion.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 2291.
141. See id. at 2292. The Netherlands provide the sole example of a foreign country
that has allowed assisted suicide to seep into medical practice, albeit without
explicit statutory authorization. The Dutch experience provided no comfort to
Justice Souter. See also Barney Sneiderman and Marja Verhoef, Patient Auton-
omy and the Defense of Medical Necessity: Five Dutch Euthanasia Cases, 34 Ai.-
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casts a dark shadow over the formalization of a right to physician-
assisted suicide in the United States. A state may experiment with
legislation while protecting the incompetent in particular and
preventing euthanasia.' 42 Beyond that, Justice Souter agreed with
the Court and with Justice O'Connor that state legislatures are the
appropriate place for factflnding and experimentation on this impor-
tant and evolving issue. 143 It would be poor form for the Court to an-
nounce a new and perhaps fleeting unenumerated constitutional right
when the legislative branch, with its "more flexible mechanisms," is
the superior forum for "moving forward and pulling back as facts
emerge within [the State's] jurisdictions."x44
Returning to the Court's opinion, discussed briefly at the beginning
of this section,' 4 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court found
no due process violation in Washington's prohibition against causing
or aiding suicide.' 46 The historical treatment of suicide and assisted
suicide in Washington and other states contributed to the Court's
holding.' 47 The Court relied in both cases upon widespread state op-
position to physician-assisted suicide.148 Particular emphasis was
placed upon the continual reaffirmation of prohibitions on assisted su-
icide by voters and legislators.'4 9 Additionally, New York State's
Task Force on Life and the Law, touted as a "blue-ribbon commission"
by the Court, unanimously recommended against changing the ex-
isting law that bans assisted suicide.i-o President Clinton also ex-
pressed his opposition to assisted suicide when he signed the Federal
BERTA L. REv. 374, 414-15 (1996)(noting sociocultural origins of Dutch approach
as basis that its system is not necessarily for export).
142. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2292 (1997)(Souter, J.,
concurring).
143. See id. at 2293 (suggesting that legislative experimentation is "entirely proper, as
well as highly desirable"); see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's view).
144. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2293 (1998)(Souter J., concurring).
145. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
146. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997).
147. See id. at 2262 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 842
nn.10-13 (9th Cir. 1996)(Beezer, J., dissenting)(referring to weight of state au-
thority prohibiting assisted suicide)).
148. See id. at 2263-64 (1997)(discussing state statutory bans and common law tradi-
tion); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1998)(discussing "overwhelming ma-
jority of state legislatures [that] have drawn a clear line between assisting
suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medi-
cal treatment by prohibiting the former and permitting the latter"); see also
Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 17-
56 (1985).
149. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 (1997)(noting Oregon as the
only exception to this trend, while Iowa and Rhode Island recently joined those
states banning assisted suicide); see also id. at 2263 n.8 (discussing Louisiana's
enactment of statutory ban).
150. See id. at 2267 (citing NEw YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 120).
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Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the
use of federal funds for physician-assisted suicide.151 In addition, the
Model Penal Code favors prohibiting aiding or soliciting another to
commit suicide.15 2
The Court expressed its ongoing reluctance to expand substantive
due process rights.'53 The liberty protected therein should not "be
subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this
Court."'54 Implicit in this is the notion that the legislative branch
would provide a more representative, and thus a more democratic per-
spective, than the nine Justices. The Court sought an objective deter-
mination of fundamental rights based upon interests "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."' 5 5 The fundamental right must
be implicated by the challenged state action as a threshold require-
ment before the balancing of competing interests will occur.' 5 6
The question formulated in Glucksberg was "whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to com-
mit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so."' 5 7
The Court responded to this question by noting the "almost universal
tradition," that, even today, rejects the asserted right.158 Withdraw-
ing treatment, as in Cruzan, is simply a different case from assisted
suicide. This is true in part because unwanted treatment is often in-
vasive and violative of a patient's privacy. The common law of battery
frowns upon a touching without informed consent. This, as well as
past Supreme Court precedent, supported the Court's recognition of a
competent person's "'constitutionally protected liberty interest in re-
fusing unwanted medical treatment.'1"59 This right was assumed to
151. See id. at 2266 (citing Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§14401-14408)(1997)).
The Act prohibits federal funding in support of suicide, euthanasia and mercy
killing or assistance in these acts, even if the acts become lawful. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 14401 (a)(2)-(4)(1997); see also The White House Statement by the President,
May 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (noting appropriate-
ness of legislation that taxpayer dollars not subsidize or promote assisted suicide
and President Clinton's personal opposition to assisted suicide).
152. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 n.12 (1997)(citing MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)).
153. See id. at 2267.
154. Id. at 2268 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)(plurality
opinion)).
155. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
The Court discouraged the "arbitrary impositions" or "purposeless restraints"
test of a statute that Justice Souter extracted from Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman. See Washington v. Glucksberg 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 & n.17
(1997).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 2269.
158. See id.
159. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)).
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include the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.1 6 0 As-
sisted suicide "has never enjoyed similar legal protection" as the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment.1 6 1
The Court also disposed of the respondents' argument that prece-
dent on the abortion right is analogous to the instant cases.16 2 As-
sisted suicide does not enjoy historical or even contemporary support,
and the right is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.1 6 3 Washington's ban on assisted suicide "un-
questionably" is "rationally related to legitimate government inter-
ests."1 64 The state's interests include: preventing suicide; protecting
depressed or mentally ill persons, or those suffering from untreated
pain; protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession; pro-
tecting vulnerable groups (the poor, the elderly and the disabled) from
abuse, neglect and mistakes; and preventing the slippery slope to in-
voluntary euthanasia.J6 5 In the Court's view, these are important
and legitimate interests that Washington's ban, either on its face or as
applied to competent, terminally ill adults who seek to hasten death
by physician prescription, is reasonably related to promoting.1 66
Nonetheless, the Court did "not absolutely foreclose" the possibility
that an individual could prevail in a more particularized judicial
challenge.16 7
160. See id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279
(1990)(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
161. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997).
162. See id. at 2270-71; see also Zapor, supra note 10. Brother Daniel Sulmasy, a phy-
sician and director of Georgetown University's Center for Clinical Bioethics, com-
ments that the Court's ruling contrasts with its legalization of abortion in 1973,
where the Court essentially ruled by "judicial 'fiat" in Roe v. Wade. The Court's
resistance to announcing new rights was evident in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), where the Court sought to assure that unenumerated constitutional
rights derived from more than "the Justices' own choice of values." Id. at 191. See
also, Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still A Wonderful
Life?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 519, 579 (1995)(advocating that issue of assisted
suicide be determined by democratic process, and not "judicial fiat"); Brenton K.
Morris, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Abortion of the Nineties, 20 LAw &
PSYCH. Rav. 215, 228-29 (1996)(arguing against legalization of assisted suicide in
light of danger of abuse).
163. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 2272-74.
166. See id. at 2275. The Court determined that the "relative strengths of these vari-
ous [state] interests" need not be weighed. Id. The Court explicitly rejected the
court of appeals' holding that the Washington ban was unconstitutional "as ap-
plied" to a particular class. See id. at 2275 & n.24.
167. See id. at 2275 & n.24. The Court noted that "such a claim would have to be quite
different from the ones advanced by respondents here." Id. at 2275 n.24. The
Court derived its language from Justice Stevens' view that a particularized chal-
lenge may prevail, but the Court seems to set the standard slightly higher than
Justice Stevens.
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In Vacco v. Quill, the petitioners faced similar historical hurdles as
the petitioners in Glucksberg.16s New York's assisted suicide ban was
not something new.16 9 At the same time, however, New York patients
had the right to refuse medical treatment or to have such treatment
withdrawn, even where it would result in death.170 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit found that New York's ban on assisted
suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause because of the inequality
of treatment among competent, terminally ill adults who seek to
hasten death. The Court stated that "those in the final stages of ter-
minal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten
their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who
are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sus-
taining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-adminis-
tering prescribed drugs."17 1 The Second Circuit equated the
withdrawal of life-support with assisted suicide and thus determined
that the distinction drawn by New York's ban on assisted suicide was
not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.1 72
In Vacco, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Equal
Protection Clause "creates no substantive rights."173 In Glucksberg,
where the Court's determination resulted from a substantive due pro-
cess analysis, the physicians also raised an equal protection argu-
ment; however, as Justice Souter wrote in his concurrence, "that
source of law does essentially nothing in a case like this that the Due
Process Clause cannot do on its own."174 The Equal Protection Clause
merely prevents states from denying persons within their jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws by requiring similarly situated people
to be treated alike; the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
treating different situations differently.175 Because the Court deter-
mined in Glucksberg that no fundamental right to assisted suicide was
present and no suspect classification was involved, the classification
made by New York needed to bear merely a rational relation to a legit-
imate end or purpose. 176
168. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). In fact the Court in Vacco referred to
the historical discussion in Glucksberg. See id. at 2296 n.1.
169. See id. at 2301 n.10 ("It has always been a crime, either by statute or under the
common law, to assist a suicide in New York." (citing Marzen et al., supra note
148, at 205-10)).
170. See id. at 2296 n.2.
171. Id. at 2297 (citing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1996)).
172. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1996).
173. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997)(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973)).
174. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2277 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring).
175. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997).
176. See id.
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The Second Circuit found the withdrawal or refusal of life-support
to be "nothing more nor less than assisted suicide."i 7 7 However, the
Supreme Court reinforced the longstanding distinction between a pas-
sive and active deed, a distinction endorsed by the medical profession
and legal tradition.' 78 The principles of causation and intent support
the separate classification even though the result may not vary. 179
The line drawn between assisting suicide and refusal of medical treat-
ment has been recognized and supported by courts as well as the
"overwhelming majority of state legislators."180 In recent years, New
York has legislatively reaffirmed its approval of the "letting die" meth-
odology/protocol, while at the same time prohibiting "killing." Fur-
thermore, in 1994 the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law
unanimously recommended against legalizing assisted suicide.'8'
The Supreme Court in Cruzan also implicitly recognized the "letting
die" versus "making die" distinction, with the right to refuse treat-
ment grounded on "traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom
from unwanted touching."'8 2 Thus, in the Court's view, Cruzan pro-
vided no precedential support for a broad right to assisted suicide.iS3
Even if the line is not always clear, "[1]ogic and contemporary practice
support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and New
York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them
differently."'s 4
. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the two decisions may prove to
be pivotal.'85 Although she joined the majority, Justice O'Connor also
177. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
178. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298-99 (1997).
179. See id.
180. Id. at 2299 n.8, 2300 n.9 (referencing case and statutory law supporting the
classification).
181. See id. at 2301 (citations omitted).
182. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79, 287-88
(1990)(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
183. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1997).
184. Id. at 2302. Many commentators would agree that the line is not always clear
between withdrawal of treatment and assisted suicide. See Sanford H. Kadish,
Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 864-65
(1992)(criticizing active-passive distinction); David Orentlicher, The Legalization
of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 443,
465-466 (1997)(arguing distinction between withdrawal of artificial life-support
and assisted suicide amounts to a "bright line rule" adopted for its efficiency
when compared with individual assessment-and its usefulness as a proxy for
distinguishing morally acceptable from morally unacceptable cases of physician-
assisted death). See generally Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in
Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. L. Ray. 693 (1994).
185. Justice O'Connor filed the same opinion in both decisions and as discussed ear-
lier, her signature upon the Court's opinion created a majority opinion. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997). Some would argue that
Justice Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg provides more scholarly analysis and
a natural law perspective that may prove influential in the future.
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carried weight among the minority. Thus her centrist position may
carry the day in a future, more particularized 'right to die' decision.
Justice Ginsberg placed her vote behind Justice O'Connor's reasons
for the judgment,18 6 as did Justice Breyer, except where Justice
O'Connor sided too closely with the Court.187 Other support for Jus-
tice O'Connor's view is evident in Justice Stevens' approval of Justice
O'Connor's language in Cruzan which implied a fundamental right to
make the "deeply personal decision" to withdraw artificial life sup-
port.1 8 8 Justice Stevens, like Justice O'Connor, was also concerned
with the pain and suffering that precedes death,189 and both Justices
indicated that a future applied challenge would not be foreclosed by
the Glucksberg and Vacco judgments.i9 0 In addition, Justice Breyer
expressed that an essential part of any successful claim would have to
include severe physical pain connected with the death, aligning him-
self closely with Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Ginsburg on this is-
sue.i 91 He, too, awaits a more direct infringement upon a central core
interest that sounds like death with dignity.192 Justice Souter is not
far behind. He is likely to side with this group when the importance of
the individual interest so demands in a narrower case, and after legis-
latures have conducted further experimentation.1 9 3
Justice O'Connor noted that respondents "urge us to address the
narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is ex-
periencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death."194 She
saw "no need to reach that question in the context of the facial chal-
lenges" to the two statutes at issue, because patients "can obtain palli-
ative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths."1 95 The
state interests that hold sway for Justice O'Connor are the uncertain-
ties in defining terminal illness and the danger that a request for as-
186. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
187. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
188. See id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring)(citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
189. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); id. at 2307-2310 (Stevens, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
191. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2311 (1997)(Breyer, J.,
concurring).
192. See id. at 2311-12.
193. See id. at 2290, 2293 (Souter, J., concurring); see also supra notes 142-44 and
accompanying text. It is noteworthy that the Court in general wanted to let the
debate continue among the American people. See David J. Garrow, Letting the
Public Decide About Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TuMEs, June 29, 1997, § 4 (The Na-
tion), at 4.
194. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
195. Id.
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sisted suicide may not be truly voluntary.196 If these deficiencies were
adequately addressed in state legislation legalizing assisted suicide, a
later, more particularized applied challenge by a suffering patient
might succeed with Justice O'Connor and a majority of the Justices
who appear willing to follow her lead.
Also, a narrow case involving a physician who aids a suicide in ac-
cordance with carefully designed statutory safeguards that authorize
physician-assisted suicide in limited instances would appear to pro-
vide a potentially successful challenge. That is, if district attorneys
can be counted on to indict such physicians. The key to a good test
case will depend upon the particular facts such as the intractable na-
ture of the patient's pain, the inevitability and closeness of death, and
the injuries to a participating physician or family member who assists
with a suicide.
Simply because the Court did not find a fundamental right to as-
sisted suicide in two cases that involved facial challenges (or at least
overly broad challenges) to state bans on assisted suicide does not
mean that this Court will continue to hold the line on assisted suicide.
The opinions displayed were "fractured", as one commentator
wrote,1 97 and the Court will inevitably be faced with more cases.198
Whether the standard of constitutional review will remain at the ra-
tional basis level when the Court eventually evaluates a viable chal-
lenge to a statute authorizing physician-assisted suicide is an
important question. If the standard of review remains the same,
which appears to be likely, a challenge to a statute authorizing as-
sisted suicide will meet the same barriers as a challenge to a statute
that criminalizes assisted suicide.199
196. See id.
197. See Garrow, supra note 193.
198. A petition for certiorari was recently denied in a case challenging the Oregon
measure that authorized assisted suicide. See Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328
(1997); see also infra notes 232-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act and the legal challenges that have ensued).
199. This is not to say that physician-assisted suicide will be legal in most states
shortly. The barriers to legislation authorizing assisted suicide are formidable,
as evidenced by the near universal absence of such statutes at this time. The
Supreme Court and Justice Souter, in particular, seemed especially influenced by
the absence of such authorizing or legalizing statutes. See generally Annas,
supra note 112, at 143 (discussing the use of ballot initiatives so public may vote
and thus circumvent unresponsive legislature, and the weakness of the initiative
method unless question is simple); Garrow, supra note 193 (discussing barriers to
legislation). See also LAURENCE H. TRBE, AmRIOcAN CoNSTITUTIoNAL LAV § 16-2,
at 1443 (2d ed. 1988) (depicting rational basis standard as "largely equivalent to
a strong presumption of constitutionality"); Paul J. Zwier, Looking for a Nonlegal
Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Care Perspective, 30 U. RICH. L. REv.
199, 247-48 (1996)(advocating limited right to physician-assisted suicide pursu-
ant to care model of decision making). But cf. Rachael D. Kleinberg & Toshiro M.
Mochizuki, Recent Developments, The Final Freedom: Maintaining Autonomy
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The Supreme Court has left the states with a formidable task. It
has cleared the way for protracted public debate, voter initiatives, leg-
islative attempts and judicial attacks upon numerous legal angles.
The next section surveys legislative activity on assisted suicide includ-
ing commentary on a proposed model statute.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
A. Model Legislation
The recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the conclusion
that courts are not the best forum within which to adjust the final
balance between an individual's right to die and the state's interest in
preserving life. Not only has the Supreme Court been unwilling to
find constitutional support for the right to die, but the Court has also
emphasized that the judiciary should not delineate the parameters of
this right. Rather, this delicate balance must be calibrated more di-
rectly by American citizens through state legislatures or at the
polls. 200
In addition to Oregon, at least eleven states have pending legisla-
tion to legalize physician-assisted suicide.201 Constitutional chal-
lenges to state statutes have multiplied in recent years.2 02 In recent
polls, a majority of Americans believe that terminally ill, mentally
competent adults should have this right.203 The majority of doctors
concur.2 04 Many doctors already assist their terminally ill patients to
die, unlawfully and surreptitiously. When a doctor's complicity in as-
sisted suicide becomes public knowledge, prosecutors and juries often
refuse to hold the doctor legally responsible for a criminal act.20 5
Many observers have pointed out that, since the rights to refuse or
withdraw from life-sustaining treatment, to have a living will and to
and Valuing Life in Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
197, 217 & n.144 (1997)(finding district court's ruling in Lee "inconsistent with
the deference usually granted to states under an equal protection rational basis
test" and categorizing state interest analysis under Due Process Clause as differ-
ent since it "pits state interests against individual liberties").
200. See Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1294 (1993).
201. See Scott FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act
and the Jurisprudence of Death, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 164 n.162
(1996).
202. See Baron et al., supra note 11, at 7 n.24.
203. See Pugliese, supra note 200, at 1317-18 nn.208-12.
204. See id. at 1315; see also Larry Tye, Right to die gains favor in survey, More doc-
tors found willing to help AIDS cases in suicide, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1997, at
Al.
205. See Pugliese, supra note 200, 1297-99. Perhaps this is why some doctors practice
doctor-assisted death without too much concern. See generally Dick Lehr, Death
& The Doctor's Hand, Increasingly, secretly, physicians are helping the incurably
ill to die, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1993, at 8.
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authorize another to make decisions about extraordinary measures,
have already been recognized, logic suggests the recognition of a right
to physician-assisted suicide.20 6 As medical technology advances,
public opinion will grow more vocal in support of the right to a doctor's
help in dying. This is the reality of society's current position on this
issue.
Those who believe that the law should recognize this reality, sup-
port the legalization of physician-assisted suicide as an acknowledg-
ment of individual autonomy.2 07 On the other hand, those who
believe that the law should function as a bulwark against the rising
tide of public opinion, see the legalization of physician-assisted suicide
as the first step towards a slippery slope, leading ultimately to the
denial of the essentially spiritual nature of life.208 The former group
believes the integrity of the choice to die can be preserved with statu-
tory procedures. The latter group believes that no statute can ade-
quately protect against the human corruptions of these procedural
safeguards. 20 9
Perhaps the best example of how states should legislate the right
to die is represented by the Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician Assisted Suicide. 210 This Model Statute was proposed in
1996 by nine experts in their respective fields, including attorneys,
physicians and academics who suggested a framework for permitting
and regulating physician-assisted suicide among patients suffering
from terminal illness or unbearable pain.2 1 Only a physician who
has a long-standing relationship with the patient, or. a physician who
has assumed full or partial responsibility for the patient's care, can
lawfully assist in a suicide.212 Such a physician can grant the pa-
tient's request if the request is competent, fully informed, voluntary
and enduring.
The statute outlines procedures for determining whether these
conditions have been met and assigns accountability for this determi-
nation to the responsible physician.21 3 In determining compliance,
the physician is held to a subjective standard of an "honest belief" that
the statute's requirements have been met.21 4 The statute also con-
tains corroboration requirements, including a second medical opinion
206. See Pugliese, supra note 200, at 1309-12.
207. See id. at 1308-10.
208. See FitzGibbon & Lai, supra note 201, at 164-73.
209. See Baron et al., supra note 11, at 4 n.1.
210. See id. at 1-33. The authors of the Model Statute continue to use the term physi-
cian-assisted suicide. See supra note 1 (discussing terminology); see also infra
notes 243-95 (discussing Oregon physician-assisted suicide measure).
211. See Baron et al., supra note 11, at 17.
212. See id. at 18-19.
213. See id. at 18-20.
214. See id. at 19.
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about diagnosis and prognosis, and an independent opinion as to the
appropriateness of physician-assisted suicide in a particular case.2 15
The corroborating physician must also vouch for the primary physi-
cian's statement that statutory requirements have been met.21 6 This
corroboration protects the attending physician from liability for assist-
ing in the suicide. Accordingly, the physician may not be accused of
murder or manslaughter, but may instead be held responsible for
medical malpractice if an error is made in diagnosis or treatment. 21 7
Under the Model Statute, the responsible physician must promptly
document the provision of medical means of suicide in the patient's
records and with the state regulatory authority.218 Most importantly,
the statute requires that the final physical act of administering the
means of suicide must be the 'knowing, intentional, and voluntary act
of the patient."21 9
The Model Statute assigns responsibility for oversight to the State
Department of Public Health, or a similar regulatory agency. This
agency receives reports from responsible physicians, collects and ana-
lyzes data, monitors and enforces the statute's requirements and
makes necessary rules for implementation. 22 0 Although data is re-
ported, the statute requires that patient information be kept confiden-
tial.2 2 1 To preserve the right to act on personal values, physicians and
hospitals may refuse to participate in physician-assisted suicide on
grounds of conscience. 22 2 Health care providers and insurers, on the
other hand, are prohibited from requiring a patient to request physi-
cian-assisted suicide in order to guarantee services, benefits or
insurance.2 23
Proponents of this statute see it as a tool for allowing an individual
access to physician-assisted suicide in a way which protects the rights
of the individual, the attending physician and the larger society. For
opponents of physician-assisted suicide, the Model Statute invites
abuse. Critics argue that neither the patient nor the doctor is fully
protected by the provisions of the Model Statute.224 Their objections
coalesce in three areas.
215. See id. at 21.
216. See id. at 29.
217. See id. at 23.
218. See id. at 21.
219. Id. at 22.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 22-23.
222. See id. at 23.
223. See id.
224. See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 72-77 (1996).
The Model State Act is criticized by these authors for many reasons. The Act
sidesteps the issue of euthanasia in what the authors call "the triumph of politics
over ethics." Id. at 73. The eligibility for assisted suicide is too broad, the proce-
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The first problem opponents have with this statute is that it does
not require, as does the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,225 that pa-
tients be terminally ill to request a physician's aid in dying. Rather,
this statute requires only that a patient suffer from a terminal illness
or unbearable pain. The intent of the statute was to recognize that
quality of life is assessed subjectively and that a person who suffers
enough pain as to make life unbearable should be permitted to seek
aid in ending that life even if death is not imminent or certain. How-
ever, critics see a significant leap from sanctioning suicide for those
who will die soon, to sanctioning suicide for those who could live indef-
initely, albeit in pain. Within this leap, critics see the beginning of the
slide down a slippery slope, ultimately leading to an unacceptable ero-
sion of the societal belief in the sanctity of life.226 For, if people are
allowed to elect to die rather than endure an uncomfortable life, will
not death be eventually seen as preferable to old age and disability?
The second problem opponents of physician-assisted suicide find in
the Model Statute is its lack of an objective body to monitor physician
compliance with the statute's procedural safeguards. Critics find ludi-
crous the statute's reliance on the "honest belief' of the physician that
the patient is making an informed and competent decision. They do
not find sufficient the requirement that a second physician corroborate
compliance with the procedural safeguards. Rather, opponents feel
that before the assisted suicide may proceed, there should be a re-
quirement for judicial review of procedural compliance. 22 7 Clearly,
these opponents are sensitive to the possibility that a responsible phy-
sician will unduly pressure the patient to elect suicide. The authors of
the Model Statute, on the other hand, were mindful of the vulnerabil-
ity of a doctor who consents to help a patient die, particularly because
the issues involved are subject to intense disagreement.
The last objection to this statute challenges the value system of
those who support physician-assisted suicide. Opponents of this ap-
proach see the Model Statute as a testament to an unhealthy belief in
individualism. 2 28 They contend that the statute does not require the
patient to consult family members about the decision to elect suicide.
dural safeguards inadequate, the immunity provided the physician too great
under the "good faith" standard and the physician's objectivity not ensured. See
id. In addition, the suicide itself need not be supervised by a physician. The
states would have too much latitude to craft rules for monitoring physician-as-
sisted suicide, and the Model Statute, in its attempt to facilitate assisted suicide,
requires documentation of the appropriateness of the suicide request but does not
leave room for contradictory opinions. See id. at 74-76.
225. OR. Ray. STAT. §§ 127, 800-897 (1995); see also FitzGibbon & Lai, supra note 201,
at 130-31 & n.15.
226. See id. at 130, 134 nn.35-38.
227. See id. at 137.
228. See id. at 137-38.
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In fact, the patient need not even notify family members of this deci-
sion.2 29 Here, again, the authors of the statute saw this issue differ-
ently from their critics. They believed the patient must be protected
from any kind of pressure from family members and that, conversely,
family members should be protected from the difficulty of counseling a
loved one about such a decision. For critics of assisted suicide, how-
ever, the exclusion of the family from this decision is a denial of the
essentially communal nature of society. To allow an individual to
make the decision to request aid in dying solely on the basis of his own
suffering becomes an assault on the importance of relationships. Such
a statute bespeaks a society where the individual's will is supreme,
rather than a society which reflects the traditional religious belief that
the meaning of human existence resides not in individual autonomy
but in the individual's connection to a larger spiritual sphere. 230
In reality, this last objection comes closest to the heart of the as-
sisted suicide debate. Those who wished the courts to find a funda-
mental right to physician-assisted suicide generally support the
concept of the Model Statute. They have faith in the individual's abil-
ity to chart his or her own course, and believe that making these
choices provides a way for individuals to determine the meaning of
their own existence. On the other hand, those who do not see any
guarantee of the right to die in the Constitution do not think that
state legislatures can guarantee this right either. Rather, opponents
of physician-assisted suicide do not assign much value to individual
choice and believe that the meaning of human existence defies such
narrow, egotistical considerations, existing instead in a realm where
morality is absolute and does not bend to accommodate any one indi-
vidual's plight. The two sides in this debate proceed from opposite
philosophical assumptions which explains why the parameters of the
debate are the same when discussing potential statutes as they are
when discussing constitutional theory.
As with the abortion debate, the fact that the right to die involves a
choice which is seen differently by two equally worthy camps is per-
haps the best argument for a statute which leaves the individual pa-
tient free to make this choice according to his own conscience. While
the specifics of the Model Statute might benefit from some fine-tuning
in terms of definition and corroboration, 23 1 the concept of the statute,
which allows individuals to choose assisted suicide within the parame-
ters of a predetermined procedure, is sound according to the propo-
nents of the right to die. Such a statute would not force terminally ill
patients, who find spiritual meaning in suffering through the process
of dying, to choose suicide. It would merely preserve this choice for
229. See id. at 137 n.50.
230. See FitzGibbon & Lai, supra note 201, at 171-73.
231. See id. at 130.
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terminally ill patients who find comfort and relief, or spiritual mean-
ing, in this choice rather than resignation to a deity's choice.
Designed to meet the objections to physician-assisted suicide
raised by courts and legislatures, the Model Statute attempts to strike
an appropriate balance between the rights of the individual patient
and the rights of the larger community. Significantly, this statute
provides specific procedures to safeguard these various rights and a
mechanism for monitoring and enforcing these procedures. However,
perhaps the most important feature of this statute, and the most im-
portant way in which it serves as a model for possible future statutes,
is the fact that it is precisely tailored to achieve a goal on which most
Americans agree, without unduly infringing upon the rights of those
Americans who do not agree.
B. Oregon Death With Dignity Act (Measure 16): A New
Oregon Trail
In 1994, Oregon voters passed the Oregon Death with Dignity Act
(Measure 16),232 the first legislation in the world which legalizes phy-
sician-assisted suicide.2 3 3 A stated purpose of the statute was
preventing unnecessary pain and suffering.2 34 However, the Measure
was prevented from implementation by numerous judicial challenges
and was subjected to a new vote in November 1997.235 In this section,
the present status of the Oregon Act will be discussed, including the
basis for the federal courts' decisions to date. After the Supreme
Court's decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco, sending the issue of physi-
cian-assisted suicide back to state legislators and public debate, Ore-
232. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127, 800-897 (1995).
233. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (D. Or. 1995) (describing Oregon Act
as first of its kind in this country but finding violation of Equal Protection
Clause), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382, 1392 (9th Cir. 1997)(finding lack
of Article Il jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs' challenge to facial validity of state
statute), cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997); see also
Clark, supra note 85, at 58 & n.47 (discussing Oregon Act as first such bill in the
world); Edward R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton, Relief or Reproach?: Euthana-
sia Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L. REv. 449, 449 (1995)(same).
234. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1434 (D. Or. 1995); Shepherd, supra note
88, at 120.
235. See Goldberg, supra note 83; see also Jane Meredith Adams, Ethics, Assisted sui-
cide gains in propriety, Oregon vote confirms years of steadily growing public sup-
port, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1997, (Focus), at D3 (discussing Oregonians'
reinstatement of its assisted-suicide law); Carey Goldberg Oregon Braces for
New Fight On Helping the Dying to Die, N.Y. Tafs, June 17, 1997, at Al [herein-
after, Goldberg, New Fight]; Joseph P. Shapiro, On Second Thought.. .Oregon
reconsiders its pioneering assisted-suicide law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 1,
1997, (Culture & Ideas) at 58 (discussing prospects that Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act may be repealed); supra note 98 and infra note 242 (discussing recent
federal agency action to chill the use of Oregon's law).
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gon became the eye of the storm with its solitary status on physician-
assisted suicide.2 36
The Supreme Court in Glucksberg mentioned Lee v. Oregon only in
passing.2 37 The case "is not before us, any more than it was before the
Court of Appeals below, and we offer no opinion as to the validity of
the Lee courts' reasoning."238 However, in the very next sentence, the
Court refers to the fact that in Vacco, the Court held "that New York's
assisted-suicide ban does not violate the Equal Protection Clause."23 9
If the Court had granted certiorari in Lee v. Harcleroad,240 we would
have had a better picture of the Court's view of the Oregon statute.241
Of course, if Oregon voters had repealed the Measure in November
1997, the petition would have raised moot questions and resolution of
the issues would have awaited a new statute and fresh challenge. In
addition, if United States Attorney General Janet Reno had not re-
fused to allow U.S. drug agents to enforce the Federal Drug Enforce-
ment Administration's pronouncement that it would revoke the
federal narcotics licenses of doctors who prescribe lethal medication
for the purpose of suicide, we would have been faced with a valid stat-
ute that would have remained unused. 242
236. See Goldberg, New Fight, supra note 235 (discussing Oregon as principal arena
for battle on issue if Supreme Court leaves matter to states); see also Ellen Good-
man, The country's first draft on assisted suicide, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Nov. 9,
1997, at D7 (discussing Oregon's citizens taking death into their own hands and
Oregon as proving ground).
237. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262 n.7 (1997).
238. Id. The Supreme Court refers to the court of appeals' opinion in Compassion in
Dying which had "sharply criticized" the district court opinion in Lee v. Oregon, a
case then pending review by the Ninth Circuit. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258, at 2262 n.7 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 838 n.139 (9th Cir. 1996)(criticizing Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Or.
1995)). As will be discussed, the district court in Lee found that the Oregon Act
violated the Equal Protection Clause due to a lack of adequate safeguards against
abuse, but the Ninth Circuit vacated this decision due to a lack of Article HI
standing in Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
239. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262, n.7 (citing Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293 (1997)).
240. 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997) (denying certiorari).
241. See generally Peter M. McGough, Medical Concerns About Physician-Assisted Su-
icide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 521, 521 (1995) (discussing in reference to Oregon's
Measure 16 that "passage and popularity of a public initiative does not ensure its
legality"). See also Don Stenberg, Steve Grasz, Public Pulse, Suicide's a State Af-
fair, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 25, 1997, at 66 (noting that Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari does not mean that the Court favors assisted suicide, and a
denial of review does not bespeak the Court's view of the merits of a case).
242. See Goldberg, supra note 83 (discussing that initial measure was approved with
only 51 percent of the vote and no sides of debate predicted victory; David J.
Garrow, The Oregon Trail, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 6, 1997, at A31 (discussing the 60 to
40 percent vote to retain the Oregon Act); see also Terminally ill lose as fed pull
plug on Oregon law, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 12, 1997, at 22A; DEA Fights Assisted
Suicide in Oregon, National Public Radio, Nov. 11, 1997, Morning Edition, tran-
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1. Case History: Lee v. Oregon
On November 8, 1994, Oregon voters authorized physician-assisted
suicide for the terminally i11.243 Plaintiffs, two physicians, four termi-
nally ill patients, a residential care facility, and individual operators
of residential care facilities, opposed implementation of Measure 16
and moved for a preliminary injunction.2 44 The plaintiffs claimed the
Measure violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment rights of free exercise
of religion and association, as well as the Americans with Disabilities
Act.2 45 District Judge Hogan granted plaintiffs' request for a tempo-
rary restraining order on December 7, 1994, and thereafter granted a
preliminary injunction on December 27, 1994, finding that the
profound questions of constitutional dimension raised by Measure 16
warranted postponing the legislation's implementation until such
questions were resolved.2 46
Judge Hogan proceeded to find that the plaintiffs satisfied Article
III standing requirements. 2 47 The requisite "injury in fact" or con-
crete, particularized, legally-protected interest that is "actual or immi-
nent" might present problems where the death of terminally ill
patients leads to mootness of their claims; however, "if a terminal pa-
tient does not have standing, who does?"2 48 Because Judge Hogan
found that the physicians and residential care providers had standing,
he deemed it unnecessary to definitively decide whether the patients
had standing as well.24 9
The physician-plaintiffs met their standing burden primarily as
third parties by showing: (1) a direct financial impact on their prac-
tices in that, when a patient commits suicide, the physicians no longer
continue to receive payment for services; (2) significant numbers of
patients would seek physician-assisted suicide if Measure 16 took ef-
fect; and (3) they had a sufficiently close relationship to terminal pa-
tients who are hindered from asserting their own claims due to the
possibility of death occurring prior to judicial resolution. 250 Standing
was similarly recognized for the residential care providers. Addition-
script #97111112-210, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Current News file.
The United States Attorney General Janet Reno has ruled that the Federal Drug
Enforcement Agency will not use its power to disrupt the implementation of the
Oregon Act. See Michael J. Sniffen, Reno Refuses to Allow U.S. Drug Agents to
Thwart Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law, BuFFALo NEWS, June 6, 1998 at 4A.
243. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (D. Or. 1994).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1493-1496.
248. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1493-94 (D. Or. 1994).
249. See id. at 1494.
250. See id. at 1494-95. This amounted to the requisite injury in fact.
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ally, the physician-plaintiffs were found to have standing to assert
their First Amendment claims.2 51 The standard for preliminary in-
junction was also met in that serious questions were raised by the
plaintiffs' claim, and irreparable harm to plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights and shortening of patients' lifespans could result if Measure 16
was implemented pending ascertainment of its constitutionality. 25 2
The district court deemed it unnecessary to reach the plaintiffs' Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act claims because there were already suffi-
cient grounds to warrant granting the preliminary injunction.2 53 The
court determined that the "balance of hardships" favored the plain-
tiffs; thus, on December 27, 1994, the court granted a preliminary in-
junction barring Measure 16's implementation pending a resolution of
the merits.254 The court noted that, "[s]urely, the first assisted suicide
law in this country deserves a considered, thoughtful constitutional
analysis."255
In August 1995, Chief Judge Hogan issued further decisions in Lee
v. Oregon.25 6 In the first of these opinions, the court decided the sta-
tus of parties to assert and defend their claims.2 57 Considering the
two terminally ill plaintiffs who had expressed opposition to physi-
cian-assisted suicide but who had histories of depression, the court
found sufficient evidence to conclude that they were at significant risk
of harm (death) due to their inability to control the timing and sever-
ity of their depression, such that if Measure 16 was to take effect, the
patients might avail themselves of assisted suicide.2 58 These two
plaintiffs had standing to assert a facial challenge to Measure 16, pri-
marily because the Measure would lessen the physician's standard of
care and disciplinary laws for those participating in the assisted-sui-
cide process. 2 5 9
The Oregon Board of Medical Examiners and Douglas Harcleroad,
a representative District Attorney from Lane County, Oregon were
deemed appropriate defendants in that they would have enforcement
responsibility under Measure 16.260 Several intervenors were ex-
cluded by the district court because the same interests were already
adequately represented by other named parties. 26 1 In contrast to an
251. See id. at 1495.
252. See id. at 1496, 1501-02.
253. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1499 (D. Or. 1994).
254. See id. at 1502 & n.6.
255. Id. at 1502.
256. 891 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Or. 1995)(standing); Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D.
Or. 1995)(merits); Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995)(issuance of
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction).
257. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (D. Or. 1995).
258. See id. at 1426.
259. See id. at 1426-27.
260. See id. at 1427.
261. See id. at 1427-1428.
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earlier finding of standing for plaintiff-physicians at the preliminary
injunction phase, upon a more complete record the court found only an
attenuated financial impact that was inadequate for the court to grant
third party standing.2 62 Individual administrators at residential care
facilities were permitted to assert First Amendment claims, but
claims against the State Attorney General and Governor were dis-
missed for lack of justiciability due to their Eleventh Amendment
immunity.2 63
In the district court's companion opinion on the merits of the plain-
tiffs' claims, Chief Judge Hogan ruled that Measure 16 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the
"terminally ill" classification was not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.2 64 The district court stated that no state shall "'deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'" 2 65
The standard for equal protection analysis requires that the classifica-
tion "rationally furthers" the state interest.2 66
The district court in Lee deemed Measure 16's procedures for dif-
ferentiating between competent and incompetent persons insuffi-
cient.2 67 Also, the court criticized the provisions which gave too much
decisionmaking power to an "attending" physician who need not be
qualified to adjudge the patient's psychiatric condition nor the volun-
tariness of the individual's request.268 Other problems the district
court perceived in Measure 16 included the requirement of "terminal"
disease or illness, a definition which is imprecise and often ascertain-
able only through hindsight.269 Further, no truly independent second
physician must verify the capacity and voluntariness of the patient,
because the initial attending or consulting physician makes the
referral.2 70
The subjective "good faith" standard of care for physicians who par-
ticipate under Measure 16 provides an additional shield, in that physi-
262. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (D. Or. 1995). The physicians had no
patients who wished to request a Measure 16 prescription, and these physicians
did not have a "sufficient personal stake" to represent such patients in that the
physicians opposed the Measure. See id. Dr. Petty was permitted to pursue First
Amendment claims. See id. at 1429.
263. See id. at 1428-1429.
264. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1431-1437 (D. Or. 1995).
265. Id. at 1437 (citing U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1).
266. See id. at 1432 (citing Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1992)); see also Kleinberg & Mochizuki, supra note 199, at 204.
267. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Or. 1995).
268. See id. at 1435. See generally Shepherd, supra note 88, at 120-21 n.98 (outlining
deficiencies district court found in Oregon Measure); Clark, supra note 85, at 63-
64 (questioning Judge Hogan's preference for a psychiatric evaluation rather
than general internist physician evaluation as permitted by Oregon Act).
269. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D. Or. 1995).
270. See id. at 1435-36.
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cians normally are held to an objective duty of care.2 7 1 The court
concluded that this good faith standard inappropriately injected the
motivations of the defendant physician into the equation.2 72 Immu-
nizing physicians from an objective duty to act with reasonable care
was held to be a "defect [that] goes to the very heart of the state's
reliance on a person's consent to die."2 73 The district court envisioned
negligent misdiagnoses as to the patient's condition that would still
meet the good faith standard of care under the Oregon statute. This
reduced standard was not rationally related to any legitimate state
interest.2 74 That Measure 16 required no physician supervision of the
patient's ingestion of a lethal drug posed the danger that vulnerable
individuals may be subjected to abuse and that the decision to commit
suicide may not be rational or voluntary at the time of death.275 The
district court looked for further safeguards during this critical time.2 76
The court found that the class of patients eligible for assisted suicide
under Measure 16 was "severely overinclusive,"277 perhaps because of
the difficulty in containing the group permitted the right under the
loose terms of the Act.278 Consequently, the court issued a declara-
tory judgment and permanent injunction against the Oregon Act.279
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's deci-
sion in Lee v. Oregon on February 27, 1997.280 Circuit Judge
Brunetti, writing for a three-judge panel, ruled that the federal courts
did not have Article III jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and re-
271. See id. at 1436. An objective standard of reasonable care incorporates community
standards and by its very objectivity, at least theoretically, provides a higher
level of protection for the patient. See id.
272. See id. at 1436-37.
273. Id. at 1437.
274. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995); cf. Clark, supra note 85,
at 64 (criticizing Judge Hogan's review, asserting that it did not follow accepted
rational-basis standard jurisprudence); see also supra note 199 and accompany-
ing text.
275. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1439 (D. Or. 1995); see also Goldberg, New
Fight, supra note 235. Reporter notes that during floor debate in April, propo-
nent of repealing Measure 16 "brandished a plastic bag as a reminder" that oral
medication alone does not always bring an easy death. The right to die camp
maintained that this fact was known all along. See also ERIC MARCUS, WHY SUI-
CIDE? 188 (1996)(criticizing Oregon Act's expectation of patient self-administra-
tion of drugs and calling it a "coat-hanger euthanasia bill comparing to women
performing own abortion).
276. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995).
277. Id.
278. See id. at 1438 (discussing Measure 16's "lowered standards and reduced protec-
tions" and its "inability to limit 'rational suicide' to hard cases" of suffering com-
petent, terminally adults).
279. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
280. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997). The opinion was thereafter
amended on March 21 and April 16, 1997. See id. at 1383.
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manded the matter with instructions to dismiss.281 The court's con-
cerns were standing and ripeness.2 82 For standing to be present, the
plaintiff must be a proper party to litigate, having suffered an injury
in fact (either actual or imminent) that is causally connected to the
challenged conduct, and that the injury would likely be redressed by
an auspicious decision.28 3 With respect to ripeness, the issues must
be ready for decision.28 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the one re-
maining individual plaintiff, whom they assumed to qualify as termi-
nal within the meaning of Measure 16, did not have standing because
no individualized showing of future harm was established.28 5 The
third party standing of residential care facilities and doctors suffered
from the same problem, because these parties asserted "the interest of
unnamed patients who are no closer to suffering the asserted injury
than" the lone remaining individual plaintiff.28 6 Absent "injury in
fact," no further elements of standing need be analyzed.287
The plaintiffs also asserted First Amendment and Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act claims based upon their projected required activi-
ties under Measure 16; however, these claims likewise suffered
standing and ripeness defects.288 Measure 16 has no specific penal-
ties for violation of most of its provisions, thus no injury, nor fitness
for judicial consideration was established.28 9 Should noncompliance
with Measure 16 result in a civil enforcement action, then it would be
more appropriate for the plaintiff doctors and health care organiza-
tions to challenge the validity of the Oregon Act.29 0 Thus, the judg-
ment of the district court was vacated with instructions to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint. 29 '
The Ninth Circuit appended the text of the Oregon Act to its deci-
sion.2 92 From the definitions to the procedures for "death by prescrip-
tion," the provisions of the Act have been subjected to much analysis
281. See id. at 1386, 1392.
282. See id. at 1387.
283. See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
284. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1997).
285. See id. at 1388-89. A chain of speculative contingencies would have to occur in
order for the plaintiff to suffer an injury. See id.
286. Id. at 1390.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 1391. These activities included mere transfer of medical records to
another physician.
289. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). No hardship would befall
the plaintiffs if their claims were not heard at this time. See id.
290. See id. at 1392.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 1392-97.
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and criticism.293 Clearly, better definitions, procedures and safe-
guards would alleviate some of the concerns, but there would remain
the same, almost unresolvable, quagmires that have been raised about
the Model Act.294 If physician-assisted suicide is to be available, then
who should qualify for it? Who will evaluate the patient and who will
track compliance with the procedures? Will patients be entitled to
more direct assistance at the time of death? Perhaps it is easy to find
aspects of both the Oregon Act and the Model Act which could be im-
proved, but whether any statute could address all of the concerns in-
herent in institutionalizing physician-assisted suicide is the more
difficult question. Had the Supreme Court determined that the plain-
tiffs in Lee had standing and that the matter was ripe for review, then
the provisions of the Oregon Act would clearly have been subjected to
further analysis. 29 5
C. Beyond Oregon to Other State Legislative Activity
With this philosophical debate as context, an overview of current
state laws and pending legislation is important. While an accurate
tally of the many permutations of these laws is difficult, the general
outlines of the legislative picture are clear. At present, state legisla-
tures seem to take very seriously the objections to the Model Statute.
In fact, only Oregon has a law which sanctions physician-assisted sui-
cide. While several states have such laws pending,29 6 no others have
293. See Annas, supra note 112, at 1241 (outlining salient provisions); Callahan &
White, supra note 224, at 30, 37, 43, 60-61 (criticizing various provisions of Ore-
gon Act, especially that scheme tends to provide "blanket immunity" for those
who participate in good faith under the Act). But cf. Clark, supra note 85, at 58-
65 (analyzing Measure 16's provisions in a more positive light); Zwier, supra note
199, 217 n.89 (comparing Oregon's safeguards as more careful than those found
in the Netherlands). See also supra notes 258-78 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing district court's analysis of Act's deficiencies).
294. See generally notes 211-30 and accompanying text.
295. See Lee v. Harcleroad, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). The questions
presented in the petition for certiorari were:
(1) Does dying patient whose recurring clinical depression makes her
vacillate between wanting suicide and life have standing to challenge
Measure 16 on equal protection, due process and statutory grounds, both
individually and as representative of class? (2) May physicians who as-
sert their terminally ill patients' interest in equal protection, due pro-
cess, and statutory challenges to Measure 16, successfully assure third
party standing? (3) Do health care providers have standing to challenge
Measure 16, and is their challenge ripe? See id. This petition for certio-
rari was filed on May 16, 1997, by James Bopp Jr., Richard E. Coleson,
Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Ind., and Thomas Alderman of
Eugene, Ore. See also National Court leaves way clear for assisted sui-
cide in Oregon, PILOT, Oct. 17, 1997, at 13 (discussing Court's denial of
review as permitting Oregon law to take effect absent voter repeal).
296. Nine states had pending bills as of that time. See An Act Concerning Assisted
Suicide, H.B. 6083, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997)(legalizing assisted sui-
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yet made it through a passing vote. The law which has taken effect is
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.297 While passed by a narrow ma-
jority of the popular vote in 1994, this statute encountered substantial
legal challenges and has only been implemented fully since November
1997.298 In addition, the Oregon Medical Association has abandoned
its neutral stance toward this Act and now actively opposes it.299
Also, the Oregon Legislature became so uncomfortable with voters' re-
actions to the Act that it decided to send the Act back to the voters for
reconsideration in November 1997.300
Several other salient points emerge from an examination of the
statutes legalizing physician-assisted suicide which are pending or
stalled in state legislatures. None appears to incorporate the Model
Statute's allowance for physician-assisted suicide solely to end un-
bearable pain. Rather, pending legislation seems to limit approval of
physician-assisted suicide to cases where death is clearly imminent.
Thus, the proposed Nebraska statute which promises "superior safe-
cide); Death With Compassion and Dignity Act, H.B. 1669, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 1997)(finding a liberty interest in choosing how, and when, to die); Dignity
in Dying Act, H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997)(creating the right
for terminally ill patients to obtain physician assistance in dying); Death With
Dignity Act, H.B. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 1997)(allowing physician as-
sisted death for the terminally ill); Physician Aid-in-Dying Act, L.B. 406, 95th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1997)(permitting terminally ill patients the freedom to end
their lives with assistance from physicians); Death With Dignity Act, Oregon Bal-
lot Measure No. 16 (enacted by a majority vote, Nov. 8, 1994)(allowing terminally
ill patients to request physician prescribed medication to end their lives); Rights
of Patients Suffering a Terminal Condition, H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt.
1997)(proposing to allow patients expected to die within one year the right to end
their lives by prescription medication); Terminally Ill Patient Act of 1997, S.B.
5654, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997)(finding that a liberty interest exists in
the choice to seek a physician's aid in ending a dying person's life); S.B. 27 (Wis.
1997)(permitting certain individuals to make written requests for medication for
the purpose of ending their lives). These bills are available on LEXIS, in the
Codes Library, and the Bill Text, and Bill Tracking Files.
297. Death With Dignity Act, Oregon Ballot Measure No. 16 (passed Nov. 8, 1994).
This was placed on the ballot by voter initiative, and passed, 51-49%.
298. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995)(issuing a declaratory judg-
ment and permanent injunction against the Act's enforcement); Ezekiel J. Eman-
uel & Linda L. Emanuel, Assisted-Suicide? Not in My State, N.Y. TnsEs, July 24,
1997, at A15; see also Lynda Gorov, Campaign to repeal assisted suicide law riv-
ets voters, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1997, at Al (discussing that no doctors have
yet prescribed medication under law and such implementation blocked pending
November vote); supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing recent federal
agency action).
299. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 298 (noting change of position by state asso-
ciation); see also Egan, Threat From Washington, supra note 98 (noting Oregon
Medical Association's recommendation not to get involved in assisted suicide un-
til DEA's threat of sanctions are resolved).
300. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 298 (reporting of the planned reconsidera-
tion of the Measure for November 1997).
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guards" against possible abuse, is titled the "Physician Aid-in-Dying
Act,"3o1 leaving no doubt about situations in which doctors can assist
in suicide. The pending Vermont bill allows a patient to request life-
ending medication from a physician only if that patient is expected to
die within one year.30 2 Other statutes generally authorize aid to a
patient suffering from a "terminal" illness or, like the Nebraska stat-
ute, to a patient who wishes to have help in dying.30 3
Clearly, such legislation indicates a desire on the part of legislators
to define as narrowly as possible the situations in which physician-
assisted suicide is permissible. In fact, this legislative stance is actu-
ally more permissive than the current stance of the American people.
Recent polls suggest that, while the majority of Americans believe
that terminal patients suffering from unremitting pain should be al-
lowed to request physician-assisted suicide, far fewer Americans are
willing to extend this right to terminal patients who have merely lost
their desire to live or fear becoming a burden to loved ones. 30 4 Rather,
Americans seem to fear sliding down a slippery slope toward loss of
respect for the sanctity of life if physician-assisted suicide is allowed
in other than the most narrowly defined situations.
Another reality which becomes clear when examining pending leg-
islation is that legislative opinion within states considering such bills
is also divided. For example, in Vermont, two bills on this issue were
filed in 1997. While the first bill authorizes a patient to end a termi-
nal illness with prescription medication, 30 5 the second bill makes phy-
sician-assisted suicide a crime. 306 The Illinois legislature is
considering three bills dealing with this issue. The first of these bills
would legalize physician-assisted suicide,30 7 but the other two bills
would amend two different statutes to specifically allow civil equity
actions to enjoin physicians from aiding in suicide.3O8 Interestingly,
in Oregon, while the fate of the Measure 16 Death with Dignity Act
301. L.B. 406, 95th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1997).
302. See Rights of Patients Suffering a Terminal Condition, H.B.109, 64th Biennial
Sess. (Vt. 1997).
303. See Death With Compassion and Dignity Act, H.B. 1669, §§ 1, 6, 19th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 1997); Dignity in Dying Act, H.B. 691 §§ 1, 15, 90th Gen Assem., Reg.
Sess. (1ll, 1997); Death With Dignity Act, H.B. 663, § 5-903, 118th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Me. 1997); Terminally Ill Patient Act of 1997, S.B. 5654, §§ 1-30, 55th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1997).
304. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 298 and accompanying text.
305. See Rights of Patients Suffering a Terminal Condition, H.B. 109, 64th Biennial
Sess. (Vt. 1997).
306. See H.B. 347, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997)(proposing to make it a crime to cause
or assist someone to commit suicide).
307. See Dignity in Dying Act, H.B. 691, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (l. 1997).
308. See H.B. 1750, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.B. 1661, 90th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997).
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remained uncertain, two other bills were pending, one of which would
prohibit the use of public funds to pay for assisted suicide.309
The legislative activity in Illinois and Oregon emphasizes another
trend which uses the law to curtail physician-assisted suicide through
civil actions or financial controls. Thus, Oregon, Missouri and North
Dakota have legislation pending which would restrict the use of state
funds or state health insurance funds to underwrite physician-as-
sisted suicide.3io In Massachusetts, the legislature is considering a
bill which would deny death benefits to anyone who assists in sui-
cide,311 while legislation pending in Missouri would revoke the license
of a physician who assists in suicide.31 2 A bill was introduced in Mon-
tana which specifies disciplinary measures and monetary damages
against physicians who assist in suicide.3 13 Thus, legislators who are
acutely aware of the dangers attendant on legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide, seem intent to apply brakes on any attempt to do so.
At the heart of this discussion is the reality that, while only Oregon
has a law in effect which permits physician-assisted suicide, thirty-six
states and territories have laws explicitly prohibiting such prac-
tices.3 14 In addition, three states have homicide statutes worded
309. See H.B. 2965, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997)(adding to definition of informed
decision); H.B. 2955, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997)(proposing to prohibit the
use of state funds to pay for assisted suicide).
310. See H.B. 510, 89th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1997) (restricting General Assem-
bly from appropriating funds to assist in causing a suicide); H.B. 1356, 35th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1997)(prohibiting use of public funds for assisted suicide).
311. See H.B. 294, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997)(denying benefits of various
kinds to persons assisting in the suicide of someone considered to be their
benefactor).
312. See H.B. 480, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997)(revoking license of physicians who
assist in suicides).
313. See S.B. 230 (Mont. 1997)(providing for discipline as well as monetary damages
and equitable relief against medical professionals who assist in suicides).
314. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.120(2) (Michie 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1103(A)(3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); ARm CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (a)(2) (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401(West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO.
REV. STAT. Ann. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); CONN GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632(5)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-702(1)(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. Comp.
STAT. ANN. § 5/12-31(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(b)
(West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 216.302(2) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.12
(West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996);
MICH. CoMPn. LAws ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1997); MmNq. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West 1987 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANNi. § 97-3-49 (1994 & Supp. 1996); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.023(1) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1996); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie
1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1985 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 (West
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broadly enough to encompass physician-assisted suicide as criminally
negligent homicide, 315 while eight states and territories in the ab-
sence of a law specifically prohibiting such suicides, have generally
condemned the practice.3 16 In the same context, the Maryland Attor-
ney General has issued an opinion that physician-assisted suicide con-
stitutes reckless endangerment. 3 17
In general, state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide forbid
both providing the means for a patient to commit suicide and the par-
ticipation in the act of suicide.3 1s Some states prohibit the act of ad-
vising or encouraging a person to commit suicide as well,3 1 9 while
other states prohibit the more ambiguous action of "causing" a sui-
cide.320 States with such prohibitive statutes assign different grades
1983 & Supp. 1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (1996); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 33,
§ 4009 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-60-1 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37
(Michie 1988 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 107,
§ 2141 (Supp. 1996); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1986 & Supp.
1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1996).
315. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (1994 & Supp. 1996)(holding a person guilty of homicide
who knowingly causes the death of another); IOwA CODE ANN. § 144A.11 (West
1993 & Supp. 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-107 (Michie 1996)(finding a person
guilty of criminally negligent homicide, a misdemeanor, for causing the death of
another person).
316. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2428 (1995 & Supp. 1996)(referring to assisted suicide as
a crime); IDAHO CODE § 39-152 (Supp. 1996) (making clear that state's 'do not
resuscitate' statute does not make legal or condone assisted suicide); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 201D, § 12 (West Supp. 1997)(distinguishing state law regarding
health care proxies, by noting that this law does not condone or authorize as-
sisted suicide); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.670(2) (Michie 1996)(noting state's 'do
not resuscitate' statute does not condone or authorize assisted suicide); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2133.12(D) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1996)(noting state's 'do not re-
suscitate' statute does not condone or authorize practice of assisted suicide); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 44-78-50(A) (Michie 1996) (excluding from state's 'do not resus-
citate' law, any authorization or legalization of assisted suicide); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996) (prohibiting assisted suicide in state's 'do
not resuscitate' law); W. VA. CODE § 16-30c-14 (1996)(condemning assisted sui-
cide in state's 'do not resuscitate' law).
317. See Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993).
318. See supra notes 314-16.
319. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406
(1995 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813
(West 1983 & Supp.1997); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4009 (1992); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 107, § 2141 (Supp. 1996).
320. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632(5)(1995 &
Supp. 1996); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-702(1)(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney
1987 & Supp. 1997).
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of felony to the "crime" of assisted suicide, resulting in a range of fines
and possible prison sentences.3 2 1
Even these prohibitive statutes, however, reveal ambivalence
about criminalizing physician-assisted suicide. For example, in Rhode
Island, state prosecutors may seek an injunction against assisted sui-
cides, or if an assisted suicide is conducted, participants are guilty of a
felony.3 2 2 Again, Louisiana's statute, like many others, prohibits phy-
sician-assisted suicide and specifically exempts from this prohibition
the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment and the provision
of medication for the purpose of alleviating pain, even in doses which
might cause death.323
In addition to state statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
which are already in effect, eight additional states have similar bills
pending.3 24 The governor of Texas has recently signed such a bill
which amends the Medical Practice Act.325 This went into effect in
September 1997.326 Several features of these pending bills bear com-
ment. The Texas bill specifically excludes from criminalization the
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment and the prescribing
of medicine for pain.3 2 7 Articulating a pervasive fear of undue influ-
ence on patients, a Virginia bill, recently signed by the governor, pro-
hibits the act of causing another to commit suicide "by force or
duress."3 28 The Virginia legislation also forbids advertising publicly
the service of assistance in committing suicide.
What emerges from an examination of these laws is the reality
that states are far from leading the charge toward legalizing physi-
cian-assisted suicide. The authors of the Model Statute described
above are clearly more comfortable with the possible effects of such
321. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997)(ranging from up
to 15 years imprisonment or up to $30,000, or both); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49
(Supp. 1996)(sentencing up to 10 years imprisonment, or up to $1,000 and 1 year
in county jail); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995)(sentencing up to 10 years im-
prisonment, or up to $50,000, or both); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 33, § 4009 (1992)(sen-
tencing up to 3 years imprisonment, longer under aggravated circumstances, and
possible restitution payments); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 107, § 2141 (Supp. 1996)(sen-
tencing up to 5 years imprisonment).
322. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-60-3, 11-60-5 (1996).
323. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32.12 (West 1997); see also supra note 316 and accom-
panying text.
324. See An Act To Provide for the Crime of Assisted Suicide, H.B. 643, 1997 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); Prevention of Assisted Suicide Act, H.B. 2531, 77th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997); H.B. 1195, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997); S.B. 200,
89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997); S.F. 244, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997);
S.B. 758, 112th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1997); S.B. 788, 1997 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 1997); S.B. 156, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 1997).
325. See H.B. 1307, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. S.B. 788, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1997).
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legislation than are people actually empowered to enact legislation.
In reality, statutes which attempt to legalize physician-assisted sui-
cide do so within the most narrowly defined parameters, and the legis-
lation seems to take account of the real possibility of abuse. On the
other hand, even statutes which criminalize assisted suicide seem to
recognize that doctors who help terminal patients to commit suicide
are not really criminals and that terminal patients have the right to
control aspects of their treatment which might affect the timing of
their deaths. In short, the issues which characterized judicial discus-
sion of physician-assisted suicide and which fueled response to the
Model Statute are much the same as the issues which emerge from an
analysis of current state laws. Overall, however, state laws seem
more oriented toward the state's interest in preserving life than in the
individual's right to control his or her own death. In fact, state laws
seem to emphasize that individual rights are best protected by recog-
nizing the importance of the state's interest in preserving life.
V. CONCLUSION
"Into the darkness they go, the wise and the lovely."
Edna St. Vincent Millay,
"Dirge Without Music,"
The Buck in the Snow [1928]
"And life is perfected by death."
Elizabeth Barrett Browning,
A Vision of Poets [1844]
"Death will be different for each of us."329 Hauntingly so, some
might add. Just as our lives and our births have differed. And, in
other cases, deaths will be all too similar to each other, although one
may wish otherwise. What is considered to be a good death will vary
for each individual and will be evaluated differently depending upon
the perspective of the various assessors of this process: the patient,
physician and the patient's family. 33 0 Each of these assessors may
look for something different in a good death. The patient may look for
relief, last-minute love and support, or a reprieve. The physician as-
pired for a more successful outcome, but is ultimately resigned to alle-
viating symptoms of the patient's decline and departure and perhaps
to avoiding negative legal and economic ramifications. The family
329. Justice O'Connor begins her concurrence with this sentence in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997)(O'Connor, J., concurring).
330. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Good Death, Embracing a Right to Die Well, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1997, Week in Review, § 4, at 1. Stolberg discusses an unsettling
idea at the heart of the assisted suicide question: for most Americans, modern
medicine has made dying worse. She posits that the fear of a painful, lonely and
protracted high-tech death has fueled the movement to make assisted suicide
legal. She also discusses the various parties affected by death and how a good
death "is in the eye of the beholder," quoting Dr. Sherwin B. Nuland.
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looks to do the right thing, but for whom? Their emotions are often in
upheaval and they are fraught with guilt at decisions they must make,
decisions they may not want to make. If assisted suicide becomes a
widely lawful option, some would argue that there will be decisions
the family should not have to make.331 But families will make them
and have to live with them. As society adjusts to this new medical
method, we are likely all to be diminished.332
Professor Kadish, in his argument against substituted judgments
about a patient's life, expresses concern about the paternalistic nature
of quality of life assessments. The question is not whether the de-
mented person can reason or talk, but can he/she feel.3 3 3 Perhaps this
is not even the bottom line. The question may be more basically
phrased-whether they still are. Yes, they still are. No doubt, most
can feel. The problem is that we feel for them. We do not want to
watch them feel, especially when what they are feeling is painful.
This may be a reason why public opinion continues to move toward
acceptance of assisted suicide.3 34 We are a culture that does not want
to face death,335 at least not for protracted periods. It seems that we
want to manage our deaths in the same way that we have sought to
manage our lives.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 1997 decisions, the tug of war
between a rightful death and the right to life continues afresh. We
may yet see a right to die proclaimed and implemented in America
through one legal avenue or another.336 In the new millennium, one
wonders just what choices the dying will face, and what choices society
will make for them. One wonders, too, why more attention is not paid
to making the end of life more dignified and less painful, and to ensur-
ing that better medical care for this stage of life is universally attaina-
331. See Shepherd, supra note 88, at 103. Professor Shepherd believes that choosing
assisted suicide is akin to the choice of which child to save when one of the two
will be sent to the gas chamber. She concludes that in both cases, no choice
should be made.
332. Justice Stevens quotes John Donne's "any man's death diminishes me, because I
am involved in mankind." Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2305 n.8
(1997)(Stevens, J., concurring)(quoting from J. Donne, Meditation No. 17, DEVO-
TIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 86, 87 (A- Raspa ed. 1987)).
333. See Kadish, supra note 184, at 881-87.
334. See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 83.
335. See John Aloysius Farrell, Justices voice doubt on a 'right to die,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 9, 1997, at 1 (quoting Kathryn L. Tucker, the attorney who argued the
Washington case, that "ours is a culture of denial of death").
336. See Orentlicher, supra note 184, at 47 (discussing that laws permitting assisted
suicide in limited circumstances will likely be adopted to bring society's laws
more in line with its moral values). But cf. Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Sui-
cide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 735, 739, 747-48
(1995) (discussing problem with limiting right to terminally ill, and the slippery
slope to euthanasia).
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ble.337 If more attention were paid to these critical issues, the dying
as well as society might be more willing to look death in the eye, notjust to stare it down, but to experience the final stage of life that pro-
vides its full meaning.338
337. See Warren E. Leary, Many in U.S. Denied Dignified Death, Health Panel Asserts
That Too Little Is Done To Ease End of Life, N.Y. Tmrs, June 5, 1997, at 14;
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Considering the Unthinkable: Protocol for Assisted Suicide,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1997, at Al (noting, inter alia, the coercive aspect of finan-
cial, family, and health insurance concerns at the time patient makes a decision
about assisted suicide). Professor Annas sees a great paradox in America that we
are more concerned about the right to refuse treatment and the right to die than
in providing universal health care coverage, improved pain control and other sup-
port for the terminally ill to help them live better. See George J. Annas, The
"Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and
Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 875, 897 (1996). Professor Annas raises another
thought-provoking point, that most physician-assisted suicide cases (especially
the Doctor Kevorkian cases) involve men killing women. See id. at 892; see also
McGough, supra note 241, at 524 (discussing irony of right to assisted suicide
where no correlative right to health care); Kamisar, supra note 336, at 769
(same).
338. See Evelyn Storr Smart, Who lives, Who dies, Who Decides; Death is a Part of
Life, Facing and Accepting Terminal Illness Can Help Both the Dying and Those
They Are Leaving Behind., L.A. Tnmds, June 11, 1997, at B7. The author argues
against physician-assisted suicide because "facing death gives real meaning to
our lives" and loving, palliative care during the process of closing down is prefera-
ble to the cost-effective method of assisted suicide. See id. She relates the story
of a forty-two year old cancer patient whose "emaciated body was curved in a fetal
position, with her mouth hanging open like a baby bird's waiting to be fed. 'How
do I look?' she whispered. 'Beautiful,' I answered. And I meant it. Her simple
humanity overpowered everything else in the room." Id.
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